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REFORMING THREE STRIKES’ EXCESSES
MICHAEL VITIELLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
California is about to mark a decade of experience with its Three Strikes
law.1 According to the law’s proponents, it would result in “spectacular
savings” for California.2 Campaign literature backing the initiative claimed
that “3 STRIKES SAVES LIVES AND TAXPAYER DOLLARS!” and
would keep “career criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children

* Professor of Law, The University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., 1969,
Swarthmore College; J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania. I wish to extend my continuing
appreciation to the Deans for their ongoing support of scholarship at McGeorge. I also want to thank
my research assistants for their excellent efforts: Thomas Swett, Kelly J. Walls, William L. Jaffe, and
Nicholas M. Zovko, for their legal research and assistance with footnoting and Jason Rose for his
assistance with footnoting this Article.
1. See Act effective Mar. 7, 1994, ch. 12, 1994 Cal. Stat. 71 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667 (West 1999)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 2004) (added by initiative measure
(Prop. 184, § 1, approved Nov. 8, 1994)). Because these provisions of the California Penal Code are
nearly identical, the term “Three Strikes law” will be used to refer to both of them collectively unless
otherwise indicated. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the
legislative history of these two provisions. California’s Three Strikes law provides that a defendant
who has been convicted of two prior felonies from an enumerated list of violent and serious felonies is
subject to a sentence of a minimum of twenty-five years-to-life upon the conviction of any felony.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999). Unlike some three strikes statutes in effect in other
states, California’s Three Strikes law includes no “wash out” period; that is, no matter how long a
defendant may have conformed to the law, earlier felonies continue to count as prior strikes under the
law. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(3) (West 1999) (no “wash out” period), with 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/33B-1 (West 2003) (third felony must have been “committed within 20 years of
the date that judgment was entered on the first conviction provided, however, that time spent in
custody shall not be counted”).
2. See PHILIP J. ROMERO, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, HOW INCARCERATING MORE FELONS WILL BENEFIT CALIFORNIA’S ECONOMY (1994)
[hereinafter ROMERO].
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and commit murder, behind bars where they belong.”3 An increasing body of
empirical data suggests that those claims are wrong and that Three Strikes
adds a significant number of inmates who are not especially dangerous,
whose age indicates that they represent a low risk of violence, and who are
increasingly expensive to maintain in prison—an expense that cannot be
justified by additional social protection.4
National media have highlighted extreme cases resulting in 25-years-tolife terms of imprisonment—cases involving petty third strikes like the theft
of a bicycle or piece of pizza.5 State trial court judges initially found some
Three Strikes sentences excessive in violation of state and federal
constitutional prohibitions against grossly disproportionate sentences.6 State
appellate courts have uniformly disagreed.7 Four United States Supreme
Court Justices raised constitutional questions about the Three Strikes
sentences in some of the more extreme cases, like that of the offender whose
third strike was the theft of a bottle of vitamins.8 Two panels of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that, in cases in which an
offender’s third strike was petty theft, terms of imprisonment of 50-years-to-

3. Mike Reynolds et al., Arguments in Favor of Proposition 184, in CAL. SEC’Y STATE,
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 8, 1994, at 36 (1994). The voter
initiative, Proposition 184, was subsequently codified in section 1170.12 of the California Penal Code.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 2004).
4. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES
AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001) [hereinafter ZIMRING ET AL.]; Linda S. Beres & Thomas D.
Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation,
87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998) [hereinafter Beres & Griffith].
5. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: The Bicycle Thief (CBS television broadcast, May 26, 2003); Eric
Slater, Pizza Thief Receives Sentence of 25 Years to Life in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B9.
6. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]he [trial] court
believed the sentence of 25 years to life which would be required by section 667, subdivision (e)
would be unconstitutional.”) (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted); People v. Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d
319, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (same); People v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(same); People v. Superior Court (Missamore), 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (same);
People v. Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (same); People v. Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d 205, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (same).
7. See, e.g., Smith, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11 n.3 (dictum) (expressing “considerable doubt that the
sentence . . . required would be unconstitutional”); Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322–24 (overruling trial
court’s holding that third-strike sentence of 25-years-to-life would be unconstitutional); Patton, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709–14 (same); Missamore, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401–03 (same); Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 251–53 (same); Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215–17 (same).
8. Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114 (1999), denying cert. to, No. E019488, 1997 WL 1168650
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1997); Justice Breyer would have granted the writ of certiorari based on “a
serious question concerning the application of a ‘three-strikes’ law to what is in essence a petty
offense.” Id. at 1116 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, on the other hand, joined by Justices
Souter and Ginsburg, recognized the question presented as “obviously substantial” but nevertheless
voted to deny certiorari because, among other things, neither any lower federal court nor the California
Supreme Court had considered the issue. Id. at 1115.
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life and 25-years-to-life violated the Eighth Amendment.9 For a brief period,
reformers could hope that liberal application of the Ninth Circuit precedent
might provide a modest reform of some of Three Strikes’ excesses. That
hope ended with two Supreme Court decisions during the 2002 Term. A
deeply divided Court upheld Three Strikes sentences, leaving little, if any,
room to argue that Three Strikes may violate the Eighth Amendment.10
Judicial relief seems unlikely in the near future.
Beyond excessive punishment in individual cases, Three Strikes will
force California to misallocate its resources.11 Three Strikes’ critics argued
that the law would shift spending from education to prison construction and

9. Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 753–67 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing
defendant’s sentence of 50-years-to-life for stealing several videotapes from a K-Mart store on two
separate occasions), rev’d sub nom., Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003); Brown v. Mayle,
283 F.3d, 1019, 1040 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing sentences of 25-years-to-life for two defendants, one
for attempting to steal three videotapes and the other for attempting to steal a steering wheel alarm).
10. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003); Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
Ewing did not produce a majority opinion. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion (for three justices)
upholds proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment but does not state outright that all
sentences under Three Strikes are lawful. Id. at 1181–90 (plurality opinion).
11. The California Department of Corrections’ early projections on increased prison costs were
too high. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 135 Fig. 8.3. In the early years after its passage, most
second- and third-strike felons would have served some prison time without regard to the law. Id. at
135. In addition, because second- and third-strike defendants account for only about 10% of all of the
crimes being committed, their total number is still quite small by comparison to all felons.
Nonetheless, the effect of Three Strikes is cumulative. By adding even fewer felons than projected,
their impact becomes cumulative with its impact peaking between 2009 and 2014. As explained by the
authors of PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:
Assuming a constant rate of 25-year-to-life third-strike offenders admitted to the prison system,
the cumulative burden is 20 times as large in the twentieth year of operation as it is in the first.
....
Because many of those habitual felons sentenced under Three Strikes would have served time in
any event, the marginal difference between Three Strikes and non-Three Strikes demands on
prison resources will be greatest in the later years of the mandatory sentences. The largest gap in
total prison resources will occur relatively late in the game.
Id.
Since publication of PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, the California supreme court has held that,
despite textual support to the contrary, a third strike prisoner must serve the full 25 year minimum
term and may not earn a 20% reduction in the statutory minimum. In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 179–80
(Cal. 2001). As a result, the logjam created by third-strike offenders will be even more severe than
projected by PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY.
Three Strikes has resulted in the incarceration of a large number of felons who are not particularly
dangerous and who will grow old in prison, further reducing their danger to society. See ZIMRING ET
AL., supra note 4, at 146. As a result of the incremental growth in the prison population resulting from
Three Strikes, “Californians will pay dearly . . . on the installment plan.” Id. at 138. Projection of the
costs run as high as a half a billion dollars a year. See AB 112 Assembly Bill—Bill Analysis: Hearing
Before the Assembly Comm. on Appropriations, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. May 28, 2003), available
at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html (quoting Assemb. Jackie Goldberg) [hereinafter AB 112
Analysis].
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force other poor financial choices.12 For several years after its passage,
California’s booming economy allowed the state to continue spending money
on prison construction and paying high salaries to prison guards without
forcing hard choices. However, a budget crisis now dominates California’s
politics and is not likely to abate in the short term.13
The obvious solution to curb Three Strikes’ excesses is legislative reform
of the Three Strikes law. This Article explores possible legislative reform.
Proposition 184, the initiative creating the Three Strikes law, requires that
any amendments to the law must be passed by a two-thirds majority of the
legislature.14 As the law’s passage demonstrated, many politicians fear the
“soft-on-crime” label that Three Strikes’ proponents would level against
them.15 The super-majority requirement makes sweeping legislative
amendment of Three Strikes difficult.16 Over the past decade, bills that would
have amended Three Strikes have floundered in the legislature.17 In 1999,
Governor Gray Davis vetoed a bill that would have merely funded a study to
determine whether Three Strikes achieved its stated goals of reducing crime
and saving the state money from lower crime rates.18 Structural problems

12. See, e.g., PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: ESTIMATED
BENEFITS OF CALIFORNIA’S NEW MANDATORY-SENTENCING LAW 33–34 (1994) (stating that budget
realities would force the corrections budget to take additional funds from the higher education budget).
13. See, e.g., Doug Smith, GOP Blames Red Ink on Democrats’ “Waste,” L.A. TIMES, July 8,
2003, at B1 (describing the current California budget crisis); see also Josh Richman, Activists: Put
Prison Funding in Schools, OAKLAND TRIB., July 5, 2003, at Local & Regional News (describing
activists’ view that funds should be shifted from prisons to education); Richard Fausset, Inmates Kept
in Cells to Save State Money, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, § 2, at 4 (reporting that one prison has kept
prisoners confined to their cells 24 hours a day to reduce overtime pay for guards).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j) (West 1999) (“The provisions of this section shall not be
amended by the Legislature except by statute passed in each house . . . two-thirds of the membership
concurring . . . .”).
15. Mike Reynolds, a citizen who was the driving force behind the passage of Three Strikes, had
enormous sway with the legislature by using the press to intimidate politicians. See Dan Morain, A
Father’s Bittersweet Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at A1. At one point when Reynolds opposed
an amendment that had passed in a senate committee, he reminded the legislators of the upcoming
elections. The committee immediately repealed. Dan Morain, Three Strikes Clears State Legislature,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at A1. No doubt, legislators feared that Reynolds would label them as soft
on crime in the upcoming election. See also Dan Walters, Few Challenge Speeding Train,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 1, 1994, at A3 (stating that “[t]he popular fear of crime is matched only by
the fear of politicians that they will be accused of softness in their approach.”).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j) (West 1999). Apart from the requirement of a super-majority,
other factors make reform difficult. As the authors of PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY have argued,
Californians believe a powerful myth about Three Strikes—that it was a watershed in penal policy,
moving from soft on crime to hard on crime, and that it led to a sharp downturn in crime rates.
ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 221. Further, single-issue politicians typically oppose reversing Three
Strikes, and a powerful coalition of interest groups has formed to support expansion of the prison
system. Id. at 222–23.
17. See infra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (discussing several failed bills).
18. Governor Davis’s Veto Message of S.B. 873, 1999–2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Oct. 10, 1999).
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face those who seek to reform the law. For example, interest groups
supporting Three Strikes, like the California Corrections and Peace Officers
Association and victims’ rights groups, have extraordinary sway with the
legislature.19 Groups opposing Three Strikes lack the resources of the law’s
proponents.20 Intensity of support for the law increases the challenge for
reformers.21
When I first wrote about Three Strikes, I argued that prospects for
reforming Three Strikes would improve when California had to start paying
for the additional, unnecessary costs associated with warehousing Three
Strikes defendants.22 More recently, I have argued that worsening economic
conditions statewide would force the issue.23 Other states have begun to
explore alternatives to long prison sentences as a way to manage budget
deficits without risking public safety.24 California’s deepening budget crisis
creates an opportunity for serious reform efforts.25 In addition, public
attitudes towards Three Strikes are changing. Despite Three Strikes’
proponents’ claims that the voters have embraced the law,26 even when the
voters adopted Three Strikes, some of that support was based on an
Davis’s reasoning was that “[a]n additional study of the Three Strikes law is unlikely to produce much,
if any, useful information that is not already available.” Id.
19. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 5, 222–23.
20. See id.
21. See ELIZABETH ADELL COOK ET AL., BETWEEN TWO ABSOLUTES: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
POLITICS OF ABORTION 199–200 (1992) (discussing the reality that legislators often respond to
organized and vocal interest groups).
22. In 1997, I wrote the following:
As is often the case with anti-crime measures, the invitation to beat the anti-crime drum is too
tempting for politicians because funding the costs associated with the legislation is usually left for
the future. Neither AB 971 nor the initiative included a provision to raise revenue. One could vote
for the bill or the initiative without a vote on how the added costs would be financed. Its
proponents were promising that Three Strikes would result in net savings, savings that have been
misrepresented.
Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395,
452 (1997) [hereinafter Vitiello, Return to Rationality?].
23. See Michael Vitiello, Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes’ Overblown
Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 287 (2002) (book review) [hereinafter Vitiello, Overblown Promises].
24. For example, Missouri began an alternative sentencing program for non-violent drug
offenders in January 2002. Offenders are supervised, treated, and counseled rather than incarcerated.
Of the 2200 offenders statewide to graduate from drug-court programs, only about 6% have committed
new crimes. See Tim Rowden, Special Sentencing Program May Be Expanded, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, June 19, 2003, at Jefferson County Post 1.
25. See supra note 13.
26. See Edward J. Erler & Brian P. Janiskee, California’s Three Strikes Law: Symbol and
Substance, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 190 (2002) (describing the public support for Three Strikes as
“overwhelming and almost unprecedented”); Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in
California, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 23–24 (1999) [hereinafter Jones]; Vitiello, Return to
Rationality?, supra note 22, at 451 (discussing proponents’ claims).
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extremely misleading campaign with little opposition.27 Then-current polls
suggested that voters wanted to target violent crime28 and were led to believe
that Three Strikes would do so.29 More recently, polling data suggest that
over 60% of likely voters would vote to amend Three Strikes to limit it to
violent felons.30 Faced with voter support for narrowing Three Strikes along
with a severe budget crisis, legislators may be open to reforming Three
Strikes. With the recent Supreme Court decisions rejecting the Eighth
Amendment challenge to Three Strikes sentences,31 legislatures who may
have hoped for a judicial solution to a difficult political problem must face a
hard choice between responsible reform and the risk of being labeled “soft on
crime.”
Apart from the cost of maintaining of Three Strikes prisoners, critics have
identified a second problem with the law’s application. Data from the
California Department of Corrections suggest that prosecutors are invoking
Three Strikes less frequently and that courts are invoking their authority to
strike prior felonies32 more often than they did in the first years after its
passage.33 While diminished enthusiasm for Three Strikes may provide a
partial solution to some of the law’s excesses, commentators have argued
persuasively that county-by-county variations lead to “uneven justice,”34 and
undercut the law, which aimed for uniform treatment for defendants.35
Disparity derives from widely different attitudes towards the law in different
counties across the state.36
Thus, the current Three Strikes landscape looks like this: California is
using limited resources to warehouse a significant number of aging prisoners
who present little risk of violence; the state must choose how to allocate
limited resources because of a budgetary crisis. But the requirement of a

27. See Michael Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores
Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1679–85 (1997) [hereinafter Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and
the Romero Case].
28. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 451–52.
29. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1684.
30. See infra note 192.
31. See Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166
(2003).
32. See infra note 171.
33. See infra note 172.
34. See Samara Marion, Justice By Geography? A Study of San Diego County’s Three Strikes
Sentencing Practices From July-December 1996, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 29, 29–30, 41 (1999)
[hereinafter Marion] (examining 185 Three Strikes case files in San Diego county).
35. See Joshua E. Bowers, Note, “The Integrity of the Game is Everything”: The Problem of
Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1164, 1180–87 (2001) [hereinafter Bowers]
(arguing that “integrity” in the law demands consistent application of Three Strikes throughout
California).
36. See infra note 176.
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super-majority makes reform difficult. Even apart from the super-majority,
politicians have not shown a willingness to take on the powerful lobbies that
have pushed a wide array of “get tough on crime” laws for over a decade.
The appellate courts have refused to provide a safety valve to correct the
law’s excesses. Insofar as actors in the criminal justice system are dealing
with those excesses, prosecutors are making charging decisions that vary
widely across the state, and judges are striking prior felonies with limited
control of their discretion. The result is one that neither opponents nor
proponents of the law should find tolerable.
This brief overview begs a question: how can we reform the system?
Elsewhere, I have argued that California should follow the lead of other
states in adopting sweeping sentencing reform, including the adoption of a
sentencing commission.37 Careful study of existing resources might lead a
commission to conclude that, for some crimes, punishment is too lenient,
while, as critics have argued about Three Strikes, it is too severe for many
offenders.38 Other states have achieved rational sentencing reform through
the sentencing commission-sentencing guidelines route.39 Adoption of
similar legislation would allow California to make rational use of its finite
prison resources, which should result in significant financial savings. Absent
wholesale reform, California should look for narrow, incremental reform to
avoid some of the excesses created by Three Strikes. This Article proposes
one such statute, one that might require only a legislative majority and that
would define the ambiguous term “in furtherance of justice,” in Penal Code
§ 1385, not Three Strikes itself.40
Part II of this Article discusses the evidence that Three Strikes has failed
in its promises to save money and lives and that the benefits that it delivers
are unnecessarily expensive in light of limited benefits that it provides.41 Part
III reviews the lack of success that Three Strikes defendants have had in the

37. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 461–62.
38. Some of Three Strikes’ critics argued that Three Strikes leads to punishment that is too
severe for some offenders and not severe enough for others. For example, Marc Klaas, Polly Klaas’s
father, labeled Three Strikes as “too hard on soft crime and too soft on hard crime.” See Daniel M.
Weintraub, Lone Justice, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at E1 [hereinafter Weintraub] (paraphrasing Marc
Klaas). I previously argued that “a defendant who has committed two residential burglaries and is
currently charged with possession of narcotics will be imprisoned for a minimum term of twenty years
while an offender who commits first degree robbery will face a maximum term of nine years.”
Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 454. I based that comparison on the assumption that
Three Strike prisoners could earn up to a 20% reduction in their sentences, but the state supreme court
later rejected that reading of the statute. See In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 179–80 (Cal. 2001).
39. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
41. See discussion infra Part II.
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courts and in the legislature.42 Part IV addresses possible legislative reforms.
It discusses the sentencing commission model.43 It then discusses why a
narrow statute that would give content to “in furtherance of justice” would
require only a simple majority in the legislature and would be desirable.44
Such a law would clarify a statute, § 1385, that the state supreme court has
already found to be ambiguous, and it would not circumvent Three Strikes.45
Finally, Part V describes the proposed legislation.46
II. “3 STRIKES SAVES LIVES AND TAXPAYER DOLLARS!”
Three Strikes’ proponents argue that incarceration of repeat offenders is
“the only sure method to keep our citizens safe.”47 Its drafters targeted repeat
offenders who, they contended, commit a disproportionate amount of
crime.48 As a result, taking that group off the street should result in
significant savings. For example, during passage of Three Strikes, Governor
Pete Wilson’s chief economist reported that Three Strikes would save the
state billions of dollars.49 The economist based his calculations on a “highly
conservative” estimate that incarcerating each offender would prevent
between 20 and 150 crimes per year.50 When he factored in savings to
victims in the form of out-of-pocket expenses like lost wages and pain and
suffering and savings in unnecessary security services, the economist
estimated total savings of between $200,000 and $300,000 for each year that
an offender was in prison.51 Based on those assumptions, the report
concluded that Three Strikes would save California many billions of dollars
each year.52
While critics have pointed to serious methodological flaws in those
estimates,53 other supporters of increased incarceration use less

42. See discussion infra Part III.
43. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
44. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
45. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
46. See discussion infra Part V.
47. Jones, supra note 26, at 25.
48. See id. at 24; see also James A. Ardaiz, California’s Three Strikes Law: History,
Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 9 (2000) [hereinafter Ardaiz]. Justice Ardaiz
was one of several individuals who “formulated the concepts behind . . . the Three Strikes Law.” Id. at
2.
49. See ROMERO, supra note 2, at 2–5.
50. See id. at 2.
51. See id. at 2–5.
52. See id. at 5.
53. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1676 n.195 (quoting
critics that refer to Philip Romero’s report as employing estimates that were not “conservative” but
were “just plain wrong.”).
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unsubstantiated assumptions to come up with similar economic arguments
supporting wholesale incarceration of criminal offenders. For example, a
National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) report argues that incarceration
is the most cost-effective way to deal with crime, despite the costs attendant
to building and maintaining prisons.54
Although not dealing directly with Three Strikes, the NCPA report is
consistent with the underlying philosophy of Three Strikes and other
recidivist statutes. According to the report, as of 1998, warehousing a
prisoner cost up to $25,000 per year, while incarcerating each additional
prisoner reduces the number of crimes committed by about 15 crimes per
year, leading to a net benefit of at least $53,000.55
After the law’s passage, Three Strikes’ proponents found empirical
support for their position.56 Then-Attorney General Dan Lungren issued a
report in 1998, claiming that since passage of Three Strikes, “the violent
crime rate in California has dropped 26.9% with a 30.8% drop in the six
major crime categories.”57 The report strongly suggested that Three Strikes
was responsible for the “largest overall drop in crime in any four-year period
in history with double digit drops in every major crime category between
1994 and 1997.”58 Then-Secretary of State Bill Jones, the original sponsor of
Three Strikes in the Assembly,59 pointed to additional data indicating that
California’s decline in crime far exceeded the decline around the rest of the
United States as evidence that Three Strikes was the reason for California’s
sharply declining crime rates.60
Certainly, the facts of some Three Strikes cases support the optimism of
Three Strikes proponents. For example, John Earl Cartwright’s 30-year
criminal history included “convictions for voluntary manslaughter, rape,
burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon.”61 A trial court sentenced

54. See MORGAN O. REYNOLDS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: 1998 1–5, available at http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s219.html [hereinafter
REYNOLDS]; see also Kent Scheidegger & Michael Rushford, The Social Benefits of Confining
Habitual Criminals, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 59, 61 (1999) [hereinafter Scheidegger & Rushford]
(describing an economist’s study which estimated that the social benefit of reduced crime is over
$50,000 per prisoner per year while the cost of incarceration is just over $20,000).
55. See REYNOLDS, supra note 54, at 3 (using Bureau of Justice Statistics figures and an
economist’s study of twelve states to estimate the monetary costs and savings of imprisonment).
56. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 26, at 24–25; Ardaiz, supra note 48, at 31–34.
57. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ‘THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE
OUT’—ITS IMPACT ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFTER FOUR YEARS 3 (1998),
available at http://www.threestrikes.org/cag98_pgthree.html.
58. Id.
59. See Jones, supra note 26, at 23.
60. See id. at 24.
61. People v. Cartwright, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

Washington University Open Scholarship

p 1 Vitiello book pages.doc 4/12/2004

10

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 82:1

Cartwright to 375-years-to-life plus an additional 53 years in prison based on
19 felony convictions arising out of violent sexual assaults on three women.62
Richard Allen Davis, the repeat felon whose kidnapping and murder of Polly
Klaas resulted in the overwhelming public support for Three Strikes,63 had a
similar history of violent crime.64 One can hardly argue against severe
criminal sentences for such offenders. But whether cases like Davis’s and
Cartwright’s prove that Three Strikes is the right answer for California’s
crime problem is less certain than its proponents claim.65
Numerous Three Strikes’ defendants present a different criminal profile
from violent offenders like Cartwright and Davis. For example, Jesus
Romero and Leandro Andrade, the defendants in two widely reported Three
Strikes cases,66 were aging felons and addicted to drugs, when they
committed their third strikes. Their earlier criminal records that brought them
within the law involved residential burglary,67 classified as a serious, not a

62. Id.
63. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1655–56 (concluding
that Davis’s status as a repeat offender “may have assured the passage of ‘three strikes’”); Paul J.
Pfingst et al., “The Genie’s Out of the Jar”: The Development of Criminal Justice Policy in
California, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 717, 738 (2002) [hereinafter Pfingst et al.] (explaining that the
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” hotline overwhelmed the local telephone system immediately after
Polly’s body was discovered).
64. One writer has described Davis’s prior crimes in some detail. See Denise Noe, All About
Polly Klaas and Richard Allen Davis, Court TV’s Crime Library, at http://www.crimelibrary.com/
serial_killers/predators/klaas/1.html (last visited July 23, 2004). For example, in 1976, he “perpetrated
his first provable violent crime against a woman.” Denise Noe, Bad Parents, Sadistic Child, Court
TV’s Crime Library, at http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers/predators/klaas/4.html (Previously,
he was suspected of murdering a woman with whom he was friends, but police ruled the death a
suicide.). Davis saw a woman getting into her car in a parking lot and believed that he heard her voice
“talking inside his brain and ‘wondering what it was like to be raped.’” Id. Davis menaced her with a
knife, forced her into her car, drove her to a deserted area, stole her wallet and commanded her to
perform fellatio. She managed to escape and flag down a California highway patrolman. Id.
Sent to Napa State Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, Davis escaped. On the night of his
escape, he broke into a 32-year-old woman’s home and battered her with a poker. A few days later,
after having stolen a shotgun and ammunition, he attacked another woman as she got into her car.
While he paused to tie her hands with tape, she escaped. Id.
After a term of imprisonment, Davis hooked up with Sue Edwards, a young woman making her
living as a drug dealer. See id.; Denise Noe, Motorcycle Mama, Court TV’s Crime Library, at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/serial_killers/predators/klaas/5.html [hereinafter Noe, Motorcycle
Mama]. The two went on a multi-state crime spree. In November, 1984, they broke into a woman’s
home and threatened to kill her and her family. When the woman tried to escape, “Davis struck her in
the face, hard, with his pistol, causing her to splatter blood.” Noe, Motorcycle Mama, supra. Later
during their travels, Davis and Edwards robbed a bank. Id.
65. In fact, Marc Klaas, the father of Polly Klaas, withdrew support for Three Strikes before its
passage because he believed too many nonviolent criminals would be incarcerated. See Vitiello,
“Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1659.
66. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.
Ct. 1166 (2003).
67. Romero’s two prior felonies were burglary and attempted burglary of an inhabited dwelling.
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violent, felony under California law.68 Romero’s third strike was the felony
possession of a small amount of cocaine;69 Andrade’s two counts of petty
theft would have been misdemeanors but for his prior criminal conduct.70 In
fact, data assembled by the California Department of Corrections
demonstrate that most third-strike sentences have involved non-violent third
strikes.71 Cases like those of Andrade and Romero are more common than
those of Cartwright and Davis and suggest why Three Strikes has not, in fact,
delivered on its promises and why the law misallocates limited resources.
Prior to passage of Three Strikes, critics argued that the law swept too
broadly, even if one agreed with the general premise that incapacitating highrate offenders would lead to a sharp decline in crime.72 Reports like those
prepared by Governor Wilson’s economist and the NCPA use aggregate data
to project the number of crimes that a year of incarceration prevents.73 Thus,
they argue that each additional year of incarceration per offender prevents the
commission of 15 or more crimes.74 Those numbers are inflated. Those
numbers should be discounted depending on the age of the offender. Even
high-rate offenders slow down as they age; for example, violent offenders’
criminal careers wane beginning at around 28 years of age.75 The absence of
a “washout” period76 in the Three Strikes law increases the number of aging
felons who may have committed felonies in their youth but no longer
represent a significant threat as they age. Thus, the projection that Three
Strikes prevents 15 crimes (or, as argued by Wilson’s chief economist, 20 to
Romero, 917 P.2d at 631. In 1983, Andrade pleaded guilty to three counts of residential burglary.
Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1170.
68. A “serious felony” is defined as “a serious felony listed in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7.”
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(4) (West 1999). “[A]ny burglary of the first degree” is a “serious felony”
under Section 1192.7(c)(18). CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(18) (West Supp. 2004).
69. Romero, 917 P.2d at 631.
70. Typically, petty theft is a misdemeanor under California law. However, petty theft with a
prior conviction is treated as a “wobbler” that can be punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony.
Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1170.
71. See Marion, supra note 34, at 30 (stating that “property, drug, and other non-violent offenses
account for nearly 60 percent of [Three Strikes sentences]”) (citing DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CAL.
DEP’T OF CORR., THIRD STRIKE CASES BY SEX AND ETHNIC GROUP 11 (1999)); see also SECOND AND
THIRD STRIKERS IN THE INSTITUTION POPULATION: DECEMBER 31, 2002 (2003) [hereinafter
INSTITUTION POPULATION], available at http://www.corr.ca.gov/OffenderInfoServices/Reports/
Quarterly/Strike1/STRIKE1d0212.pdf. As of December 31, 2002, the California prison system
contained 7,626 third strike offenders. INSTITUTION POPULATION, supra, at tbl.1. Of these offenders,
4,158 (54.5%) had committed either a property crime, drug crime, or other non-violent crime. Id.
72. See Weintraub, supra note 38, at E1 (paraphrasing Marc Klaas).
73. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
74. See supra text accompanying note 55.
75. See Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California’s “Three Strikes
and You’re Out” Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 65, 68 (1999) [hereinafter Males & Macallair].
76. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(3) (West 1999).

Washington University Open Scholarship

p 1 Vitiello book pages.doc 4/12/2004

12

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 82:1

150) is implausible when the third-strike defendant is an aging felon whose
criminal career is winding down.77
Close scrutiny of existing studies on the effect of incapacitation shows
that those numbers are far too high. Professors Franklin Zimring and Gordon
Hawkins examined the available data concerning the causal link between
incarceration and crime reduction78 and came to wildly different conclusions
about how much incarceration lowers crime rates. Studies examined by
Zimring and Hawkins varied from estimates that as little as three crimes per
year are prevented to as high as 187 crimes per year.79 The authors argued
that the wide disparity in existing studies is a function, in large part, of
different methodologies.80 After an examination of that data, they concluded
that California’s dramatic increase in incarceration resulted in a drop of only
about 3.5 crimes per offender per year of incarceration.81 Critics have raised
similar concerns about estimated savings, arguing that a reduction in crime of
only 3.5 crimes per year/per offender would save the state $3,500 to
$7,000—far less than the cost of incarceration.82
In addition, Three Strikes is not well designed to meet its goal of
incapacitating high-rate offenders. Requiring only two prior serious or
violent felonies limits the law’s ability to single out high-rate offenders.
High-rate offenders, ones committing far more than the median number of
crimes per year,83 may come within the law’s provisions, but so too will

77. See California’s Aging Prison Population, Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on the
California Correctional System of the California Senate Comm. on Public Safety 14–18 (written
statement of professor Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George Washington
University Law School) (on file with author) [hereinafter Turley]. Turley presents data that show
recidivism rates are far lower among older prisoners than younger prisoners. For example, a federal
study of recidivism rates by age found that prisoners above age 40 had a recidivism rate of 11% while
prisoners under age 40 had a recidivism rate of 31.6%. Id. at 16. In addition, a study of the New York
prison system found that the recidivism rate for inmates over age 65 is as low as 7.4%. Id. at 17.
Insofar as aging felons continue to commit crimes, they are usually not the kinds of violent crimes
like rape, murder, and child molestation that the public was concerned about in its passage of Three
Strikes. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining that most third strike offenders
committed non-violent crimes).
78. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND
THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 100–27 (1995) [hereinafter ZIMRING & HAWKINS].
79. Id. at 38, 50, 145.
80. Id. at 80. For example, one study, focusing on offenders’ self reporting, was considered
unreliable because of problems with memory and because of the sample questioned (offenders at the
height of their careers). Id. at 81–86. Other studies have relied on community impact. Those studies
indicate that the impact on the crime rate of incarcerating an individual depends on whether he is
readily replaced by other offenders. Id. at 43.
81. Id. at 114–17.
82. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 436–37.
83. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1674–75 n.188 (stating
that 10% of repeat offenders are extremely active criminals who commit more than 600 crimes
apiece).
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many offenders who do not commit anywhere near that number of crimes per
year. According to DANGEROUS OFFENDERS, a provocative book about the
criminal justice system’s response to high-rate offenders, the system does a
poor job of identifying the truly high-rate offenders whose incarceration
would prevent significant criminal conduct.84 The authors argued that
recognizing high-rate offenders is difficult because crimes like robbery are
hard to solve and because once the police arrest an offender, the system has a
bias against investigating all potential charges against the offender.85 That is
so because, once the police are confident of a conviction on the current
charge, they have little incentive to investigate old charges.86
Three Strikes’ proponents intended to cast a wide net.87 Apart from
concerns about proportional punishment, especially in cases in which the
third strike is a relatively trivial offense,88 the effect of casting such a wide
net is that the law imposes very long terms of imprisonment on offenders
who represent a low social risk because they are not high-rate offenders and
because their criminal careers are winding down.89
Since passage of Three Strikes, an increasing body of literature supports
those who questioned the claims of Three Strikes proponents.90 For example,
critics question the 1998 Attorney-General report’s methodology. The report

84. See MARK H. MOORE ET AL., DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: THE ELUSIVE TARGET OF JUSTICE 53
(1984).
85. See id. at 49.
86. See id. at 49–50 (explaining that a prosecutor may choose not to introduce evidence of prior
crimes because it might weaken a case that is certain to result in conviction).
87. See, e.g., Ardaiz, supra note 48, at 8 (describing the target group of Three Strikes as “people
who have demonstrated a repeated pattern of criminal behavior”); see also Jones, supra note 26, at 23–
24 (discussing the origins of three strikes).
88. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1169–70 (2003) (stealing less than $200
worth of video tapes); Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1183 (2003) (stealing $1200 worth of golf
clubs); Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (consolidated cases involving
stealing three video tapes and stealing a steering wheel alarm), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 1509 (2003);
People v. Barrera, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (forging a $400 check); People v.
Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (possessing codeine).
89. See supra notes 75, 84 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 78, 126–27 (finding the increase in incarceration
rate has substantially less of an impact on crime rates than claimed by proponents); ZIMRING ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 96 (finding the amount of general deterrence is significantly less than claimed by
proponents); Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did “Three Strikes” Cause the Recent Drop in
California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General’s Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
101, 104–26 (1998) [hereinafter Analysis of AG’s Report] (challenging the methodology used in prior
studies); Beres & Griffith, supra note 4, at 129–38 (questioning whether Three Strikes targets the right
offenders); Males & Macallair, supra note 75, at 68 (finding that the largest drop in crime rate was for
those under 24 years old rather than for those between 30 and 40 years old); Vitiello, Overblown
Promises, supra note 23; David Shultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of “Three Strikes”
Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 557, 572–74 (2000) (discussing alternative explanations for the drop in crime rate).
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aggregated pre-Three Strikes data, masking the pre-1994 decline in the crime
rate:
The violent crime rate rose sharply in 1989 and 1990 and rose by
lesser amounts in 1991 and 1992. The pattern reversed in 1993, one
year before Three Strikes, when the violent crime rate declined by
4.1%. . . . The AGR conceals the fact that the violent crime rate began
to fall the year before Three Strikes was adopted by lumping the year
1993 with the years 1990-92 when the violent crime rate rose.91
Probably the most thorough study to date, PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA,
demonstrated graphically that crime rates were declining before passage of
Three Strikes and continued to decline at the same rate after its passage.92
Other data also raise questions about Three Strikes’ proponents’ claims: for
example, while crime was declining, the decline was steepest among younger
felons, not older felons more likely to be subject to Three Strikes’
provisions.93
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY did not rely on aggregate data, but
looked at arrest records of no-, one- and two-strike offenders to see who was
committing what kinds of crimes.94 Their findings cast doubt on the
effectiveness of Three Strikes. Among their findings were the following: the
amount of crime committed by third-strike offenders amounted to only about
3.3% of the total amount of crime; one- and two-strike offenders committed
only about 10.5% of all of the crimes committed.95 The study also found that
the targeted population did not commit more than their proportionate share of
crime.96 In addition, offenders subject to third-strike sentences are not a
particularly violent group. As I have written elsewhere, summarizing the
authors’ findings,

91. Analysis of AG’s Report, supra note 90, at 107.
92. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 88 fig.6.1.
93. See Analysis of AG’s Report, supra note 90, at 121, 124–25. As pointed out by Professors
Beres and Griffith, other data undercut the AG’s report. For example, they addressed the AG’s claim
that crime declined more sharply in California than elsewhere in the nation. But during the mid-1990s,
the drop in violent crime was greatest among urban minority youth in California as elsewhere. Hence,
states with significant numbers of minority youths living in urban centers experienced the largest
decline in their crime rates. Massachusetts and New York have similar populations of urban youth, but
did not enact three strikes statutes, and experienced drops in crime rates similar to the decline in
California. Id. at 127–30.
94. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 43–56.
95. See id. at 59.
96. See id. at 43–46, 59.
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[N]o-strike and one-strike felons are arrested for violent offenses
approximately in proportion to their numbers in the total number of
those arrested for all offenses. But third-strike offenders actually are
less likely to be arrested for violent offenses when the authors
compare how often they were arrested for a felony and how often they
were arrested for a crime of violence.97
No- and one-strike felons committed about 22 non-violent crimes for every
violent crime. By comparison, felons subject to third-strike penalties
committed only one violent crime in 33 crimes.98
Thus, the data demonstrate that Three Strikes does not successfully
incarcerate the class of criminal defendants whom the law targeted.99 That
conclusion is not surprising in light of the arguments raised above: the law’s
provisions are too broad, for example, because it makes residential burglary a
first or second strike and any felony a third strike;100 none of its provisions
singles out particularly active offenders, and its lack of a washout period and
sweeping provisions increase the likelihood that qualifying offenders are
aging felons.101
Elsewhere, I have criticized Three Strikes because it produces
disproportionate punishment.102 Here, I want to focus on another problem
with the law: the misallocation of resources resulting from Three Strikes. As
indicated above, incarceration is expensive and typically costs more than the
concomitant savings.103 If Three Strikes were going to save California money
through reduction in crime, it was because the law would lead to the
incarceration of dangerous felons, whose violent crimes are more costly than
non-violent crimes. That simply has not happened.104
When Three Strikes became law, some commentators projected that the
law would result in massive increases in the prison population.105 That has

97. Vitiello, Overblown Promises, supra note 23, at 273 (citing ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at
47, 59).
98. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 47.
99. See Vitiello, Overblown Promises, supra note 23, at 273.
100. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c)(9) (West 1999) (including residential burglary); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999) (qualifying any felony as a third strike).
101. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(3)
(West 1999) (lacking a washout period).
102. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 454–55.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 55, 82.
104. See supra notes 92–101 and accompanying text.
105. The impact on the prison system was less severe than projected because one- and two-strike
defendants commit only about 10% of all felonies. Hence, their numbers are relatively small by
comparison to all potential inmates. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 134.
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not happened.106 But, Three Strikes has had an incremental effect on the
prison population, and this effect will continue to grow. During the first few
years, it did not account for a significant increase in the prison population
because most third-strike offenders would have served some prison time
anyway107 and because they represent a small percentage of all criminal
offenders.108 But the impact of third-strike offenders began when, but for
Three Strikes, the offenders would have been released, and the impact of
prisoners sentenced under the Three-Strikes Law will culminate between
2009 and 2014 when “the system will contain 20 years’ worth of sentenced
offenders.”109
During the economic boom during the late 1990s, California did not have
to make hard budgetary choices. It could fund education, increase prison
construction, pay for prison guards, and give Californians a tax cut.110 Those
days are gone.111 While the legislature and the Governor struggle with a
massive deficit, they are unwilling to roll back a pay raise for prison
guards.112 At the same time, continued prison construction is unlikely.
As a result, California must recognize that prison resources are finite. In
that setting, Three Strikes’ misallocation of resources becomes apparent. As
the data demonstrate, Three Strikes fills prison cells with offenders who are
not particularly dangerous and who are aging.113 Not only are they less
dangerous as they age, but they are also more expensive to maintain. In
addition to the cost of prison construction, the state pays about $26,000 per

106. See infra note 172.
107. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 135.
108. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (stating that third-strike offenders commit about
3.3% of the total amount of crime).
109. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 135. The authors’ point understates the total impact of third
strike sentences. They estimated the peak impact based on twenty years of experience with Three
Strikes and appear to have used twenty years on the assumption that Three Strikes’ prisoners would be
eligible for release after serving twenty years of their minimum 25 year sentences. That is certainly a
plausible, if not the most plausible, reading of the statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(5) (West
1999) (allowing up to 20% good time credits). After the publication of PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY, the State Supreme Court held that the 20% reduction in sentence does not apply to the
25 year minimum term of imprisonment. Hence, an offender must serve a minimum of twenty-five
years. In re Cervera, 16 P.3d 176, 179–81 (Cal. 2001).
110. See Greg Lucas, Senate OKs Generous State Budget, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 11, 1998, at A17
(describing the $75.2 billion state budget which includes $22.3 billion for education and $1.4 billion in
tax cuts); Robert B. Gunnison, Prison Guards Win 12% Pay Increase, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 1998, at
A20.
111. See supra note 13.
112. See Gregg Jones, Union Backs Off on Talks Over Pay Concessions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2003, at B8 (reporting that the legislature approved a contract between Governor Davis and
California’s prison-guards union that will increase guards’ pay by as much as 37% over the next five
years).
113. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
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year to warehouse an average offender.114 By contrast, older felons cost the
state between $40,000 and $70,000 per year.115 When those figures are
projected into the future, the results are staggering.116 Three Strikes prevents
early release for third-strike felons.117 Without additional prison cells, aging,
not especially dangerous offenders, will occupy cells that are not available
for younger, more violent felons. That is a poor allocation of resources.
III. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS?
The obvious answer to the looming crisis created by Three Strikes is for
the legislature to fix the problem. Alternatively, when the democratic process
fails, courts may step into the breach. This section reviews the failure of the
courts to remedy the problem of excessive punishment. It then discusses
whether California’s legislature is likely to solve the problem.
Prior to Polly Klaas’s kidnapping, the state legislature gave Three Strikes
short shrift.118 The public response to her kidnapping was overwhelming.119
Her kidnapper was a repeat offender who would still have been in prison had
Three Strikes been the law.120 Three Strikes quickly appeared to be the
solution to a perceived violent crime wave.121 Three Strikes’ proponents took
advantage of public sentiment to get the measure on the ballot and to
pressure the legislature into rapid passage of the law, with little input from
any of the typical interest groups.122 Despite early opposition by diverse
groups, including the California District Attorneys’ Association, political
opposition disappeared during the short and aggressive campaign for the
law’s passage.123 The legislature first passed a statutory version of the law by
an overwhelming majority; the voters then approved the measure by an
almost 3-to-1 margin.124 A provision that would almost certainly have

114. Turley, supra note 77, at 12.
115. See id.
116. Using “conservative” estimates, Turley estimated that in year 2025 it would cost over $4
billion to house prisoners above age 60. Id. at 13. This amount is slightly more than the entire
California Department of Corrections budget for 2002. See id. at 11, 13.
117. See supra note 109 (discussing the California Supreme Court decision that rejected goodtime reductions for third-strike felons).
118. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1644.
119. See id. at 1655.
120. Eric Bailey, Assembly Public Safety Committee Turns Tough, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at
A3.
121. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1656 n.72.
122. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 411–12.
123. See id. at 413 & n.98, 414.
124. The bill passed the Assembly on a vote of 63 to 9 and passed the Senate on a vote of 29 to 7.
ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. 260 (Oct. 6, 1994). Proposition 184 was approved by
71.85% of the electorate. STATEMENT OF VOTE, GENERAL ELECTIONS, Nov. 8, 1994, at 107.
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escaped voters’ attention was a requirement that the legislature could amend
the law only with a two-thirds vote.125
The requirement of a super-majority and the hesitation of politicians to
take on powerful pro-punishment lobbying groups explain why efforts to
reform Three Strikes have thus far failed in the legislature.126 On occasion,
courts step into the breach when the democratic process stalls.127 But the
courts have seldom intervened in Three Strikes cases.128
Shortly after the law’s passage, a number of state trial court judges found
specific Three Strikes sentences excessive,129 in violation of the state
constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.130 The district
courts of appeal have uniformly disagreed.131 Apart from one dictum,132 state
appellate courts have left no room to argue that a Three Strikes sentence is
excessive. The state supreme court has yet to consider the question,133 but in
light of the uniformity among lower appellate courts, it may have little
incentive to do so.
In 1999, and again in 2001, four United States Supreme Court justices
questioned the legality of some Three Strikes sentences.134 In Riggs v.
California, Justice Stevens agreed with the Court’s decision to deny the grant
of the writ of certiorari, but wrote a short opinion in which he laid out a
number of concerns about the legality of Riggs’ 25-years-to-life sentence.135
Riggs’ third strike was petty theft, ordinarily a misdemeanor, escalated to a
felony because of Riggs’ prior record of theft.136 Justice Stevens questioned
whether the state should be allowed to double count a defendant’s recidivist

125. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j) (West 1999) (“The provisions of this section shall not be
amended by the Legislature except by statute passed in each house . . . two-thirds of the membership
concurring . . . .”).
126. For a discussion of several failed amendments, see infra notes 187–89 and accompanying
text.
127. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1700–02.
128. See Michael Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Is Judicial Activism
California’s Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2004) (manuscript at 30, 87) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Vitiello, Judicial Activism].
129. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
130. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive
fines imposed.”)
131. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
132. See People v. Cluff, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 87–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (dictum) (noting “that
the severe penalty imposed on [Defendant] appears disproportionate by any measure”).
133. See Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184 (2001) (Souter & Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
134. See Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114, 1115 (1999); id. at 1116 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Durden, 531 U.S. at 1184, 1184 (Souter & Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
135. See Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114 (Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, J.J.) (“This pro se petition for
certiorari raises a serious question concerning the application of California’s “three strikes” law . . . to
petty offenses”).
136. See id.
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conduct.137 He also alluded to possible double jeopardy problems and
questioned whether the state might be punishing Riggs for earlier crimes for
which he had already been punished.138 Finally, he suggested that Riggs’
case came within Solem v. Helm,139 which held that a term of imprisonment
imposed on a recidivist with a record of relatively petty crimes violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.140
In November, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit followed Justice Stevens’ invitation and held that an offender’s
sentence of 50-years-to-life violated the Eighth Amendment.141 Convicted of
two separate instances of petty theft, Leandro Andrade received a minimum
term of 50 years; as a result he will not be eligible for release until he is 87
years old.142 Shortly after the panel decided Andrade, a separate panel of the
Ninth Circuit extended its holding to two cases in which the defendants faced
terms of 25-years-to-life in prison, again in cases in which the third strike
was petty theft.143
Any hope that the Ninth Circuit decisions would provide a modest
judicial reform of Three Strikes was short-lived. The Supreme Court decided
Lockyer v. Andrade144 and Ewing v. California145 during the 2002 Term,
leaving little room to argue that Three Strikes sentences violate the Eighth
Amendment. The Court decided Andrade on narrow technical grounds:
because the case was before the lower court on a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus, federal law requires that a state prisoner show not only that
the state court decision was wrong but that the decision was an unreasonable
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.146 But its
decision in Ewing v. California,147 a case that came directly from the state
courts on the writ of certiorari, forecloses virtually all challenges under the
Eighth Amendment.148

137. See id. at 1115.
138. See id.
139. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
140. Id. at 303.
141. See Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 123 S. Ct.
1166 (2003).
142. Id. at 749–50.
143. See Brown v. Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019, 1028–37 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing sentences of 25years-to-life for two defendants, one for attempting to steal three videotapes and the other for
attempting to steal a steering wheel alarm), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 1509 (2003).
144. 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003).
145. 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
146. See Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1172 (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2002)).
147. 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
148. See generally Vitiello, Judicial Activism, supra note 128 (manuscript at 3).
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Ewing produced several opinions without a majority opinion.149 Justices
Scalia150 and Thomas151 argued that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to
terms of imprisonment. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion found that
Ewing’s sentence was not so long as to be grossly disproportionate to his
crime and his career of criminal conduct.152 The plurality left open some
questions about the scope of proportionality review; nonetheless, the five
justices who voted to uphold Ewing’s 25-years-to-life sentence left little
room to argue that Three Strikes’ sentences violate the Eighth
Amendment.153
One state supreme court opinion leaves some wiggle room for modest
reform of Three Strikes. People v. Superior Court (Romero)154 involved an
offender whose prior strikes consisted of a 1984 conviction for an attempted
burglary of an inhabited dwelling and a 1986 conviction for a burglary of an
inhabited dwelling; his third strike was the charge of possession of 0.13
grams of cocaine base.155 The trial court offered to strike one of the prior
felony convictions if Romero pled guilty.156 The prosecutor argued that the
court lacked the power to strike a prior felony absent a motion by the
prosecutor.157 The trial court disagreed and sentenced Romero to a term of 6
years in prison, instead of 25-years-to-life.158 The district court of appeal
reversed.159
The supreme court reversed and held that the statute authorized the trial
court, on its own motion, to strike a prior felony.160 The court had to interpret
subsection 667(f)(2), which provides that the prosecutor “may move to
dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction allegation in the furtherance of
justice pursuant to Section 1385, or if there is insufficient evidence to prove
the prior conviction.”161 It provides further that the judge’s discretion is

149. See 123 S. Ct. at 1181 (Syllabus).
150. Ewing, 123 S. Ct. at 1190.
151. Id. at 1191.
152. Id. at 1185, 1187.
153. See Frank O. Bowman III, Ewing v. California: The Supreme Court Takes a Walk on “Three
Strikes” Laws . . . And That’s Fine, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF LAW, JURIST, at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew103.php (Mar. 24, 2003).
154. 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
155. See 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996) (listing Romero’s felony convictions: a 1980 conviction for
second degree burglary, a 1984 conviction for attempted burglary of an inhabited dwelling, a 1986
conviction for first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and convictions for possession of a
controlled substance in 1992 and 1993).
156. See id. at 632.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 640–41.
161. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2) (West 1999).
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limited to cases in which “there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior
felony conviction.”162 Despite a substantial argument that the statute allowed
the court to strike a prior felony only upon a motion from the prosecutor
(based on express language and evidence of the drafters’ intent),163 the court
held that the statute intended to leave intact the trial court’s authority under
§ 1385 to dismiss a case or reduce a charge on its own motion.164 The court
read the statute as it did to avoid a conflict with the state constitution; after
reviewing its case law interpreting the state constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers, the court said that, were the statute read to make the
court dependent on the prosecutor’s motion, the statute would violate the
state constitution.165
Some commentators argued that Romero would effectively eliminate
disproportionate sentences.166 At least one commentator has suggested that
Romero has not had the intended effect: despite a strict standard of review
(the district courts review the trial courts’ decisions for an abuse of
discretion),167 district courts of appeal have overturned trial court decisions
when trial courts have struck prior felonies.168 The state supreme court has
offered some guidance on how a trial court should exercise its discretion.169
But commentators have raised serious questions about how judges and
prosecutors are currently exercising their discretion.170
Data from the California Department of Corrections suggest that
prosecutors are invoking Three Strikes less frequently and that courts are
invoking their authority to strike prior felonies171 more often than they did in
the first years after its passage.172 Trial courts and prosecutors are exercising

162. Id.
163. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 643.
164. See id. at 646.
165. See id. at 632–39.
166. See Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of
the Case Against California’s Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 60 (2000).
167. See Rebecca Gross, Comment, The “Spirit” of the Three Strikes Law: From the Romero
Myth to the Hopeful Implications of Andrade, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 169, 178, 188 (2002).
168. People v. Patton, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702, 707–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (modifying a threestrikes sentence to 25-years-to-life when the trial court sentenced Patton to a more lenient 9-years-tolife because his prior offenses did not “arouse violence”); People v. Gore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 247–
48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing a lower court’s decision to strike a prior felony conviction “in
furtherance of justice”); People v. Superior Court (Romero), 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 382 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (reversing the trial court’s order to strike a prior felony).
169. See generally People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1998).
170. See Marion, supra note 34, at 29; Bowers, supra note 35, at 1165.
171. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996) (granting a trial court the
discretion to strike prior felonies on its own motion).
172. In the first two full years after Three Strikes was enacted, 1995 and 1996, the average annual
number of third-strike offenders sentenced to prison was 1,328. If this rate held steady, and accounting
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their discretion in widely different ways around the state.173 That has led to
county-by-county variations, which has resulted in “uneven justice,”174 and
undercut the law, which aimed for uniform treatment of defendants.175
Disparity derives from widely different attitudes towards the law in different
counties across the state.176 Even if some discretionary regional differences
are inevitable, in some parts of the state prosecutors are still using Three
Strikes in questionable cases, ones in which punishment is likely to be
excessive—that is, the amount of anticipated social protection does not
justify the long terms of imprisonment imposed on some of the defendants
currently incarcerated under the law.177
for the 152 offenders sentenced in 1994, the number of third strike offenders that would have been
imprisoned through 2002 would be 10,776. See JOHN CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
165369, “THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 4 (1997), available
at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/165369.pdf (using data provided by the California Department of
Corrections). However, as of December 31, 2002 only 7,626 third strike offenders were behind bars.
INSTITUTION POPULATION, supra note 71, at tbl.1.
Moreover, in 1997 the California Department of Corrections projected that the total number of
second- and third-strike offenders imprisoned would exceed 55,000 by 2002. FAMILIES TO AMEND
CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES, LATEST STATISTICS, at http://www.facts1.com/general/stats.htm (last
modified Dec. 12, 2003) (using California Department of Corrections estimates that were reported in a
Legislative Analyst’s office paper on October 14, 1997 at the Assembly Committee on Public Safety
in Los Angeles). In fact, as of December 31, 2002 the total was significantly less than estimated at
42,703. See INSTITUTION POPULATION, supra note 71, at tbl.1.
The numbers above, coupled with the view of commentators, suggest that prosecutors are using
Three Strikes less frequently, and courts are striking Three Strikes sentences more frequently over
time. See, e.g., Marion, supra note 34, at 36–38 (explaining that recently in drug cases in San Diego
county the prosecution permitted a reduced sentence in 22 percent of cases, and the court reduced the
sentence in 51 percent of cases).
173. See Bowers, supra note 35, at 1165.
174. See Marion, supra note 34, at 30, 41 (examining 185 Three Strikes case files in San Diego
county).
175. See Bowers, supra note 35, at 1184 (arguing that “integrity” in the law demands consistent
application of Three Strikes throughout California).
176. See Marion, supra note 34, at 32, 40–41. The San Diego District Attorney’s office prosecutes
Three Strikes cases much more often than the San Francisco District Attorney’s office. This disparity
may be due in part to the public’s view of Three Strikes in each respective area. Seventy-six percent of
San Diego’s voters supported the Three Strikes initiative compared to just 43 percent of San Francisco
voters. Id. at 41. Frequency of use of Three Strikes shows no correlation to the decline in crime rate. In
fact, the crime rate in San Francisco, the county least likely to invoke Three Strikes, declined much
more than did the crime rate in Sacramento and Los Angeles counties, where the law was invoked
seven times more frequently than in San Francisco. See Males & Macallair, supra note 75, at 67–68.
177. See Marion, supra note 34, at 38–40. For example, prosecutorial discretion in San Diego
County was exercised to strike two prior violent convictions and sentence an offender to eleven years.
See id. However, when this offender is compared to several others who received 25-years-to-life with
no prior violent felonies, the author noted that “it is difficult to discern any principled basis for
imposing a 25-years-to-life sentence . . . .” Id. at 40. Other offenders sentenced to twenty-five years to
life include one for possessing .05 grams of heroin. That offender had committed two residential
burglaries, two commercial burglaries, and a non-violent jail escape. Another offender was found
guilty of possession of .21 grams of rock cocaine. She had previously been convicted of a robbery,
felony drug sales, and four misdemeanor convictions. Yet another offender was convicted of petty
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While Romero created some leeway, it has not addressed at least two
important concerns. First, it has not led to consistent standards for the
application of judicial discretion. Second, it has not eliminated the
unwarranted expense of Three Strikes. Further no other court offers much
hope for judicial reform of Three Strikes’ excesses.
Legislative reform may prove as difficult as judicial reform. The obvious
barrier is the requirement of a two-thirds majority.178 PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY,179 one of the most important books on Three Strikes, has
argued that reform of Three Strikes is not likely. The authors contend that
Californians believe that Three Strikes represented a shift in penal
philosophy from soft to hard on crime and that the law is responsible for the
decline in crime.180 In addition, the authors doubt that empirical data will
counteract the strong intuitive appeal that severe sanctions work.181
In addition, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY argued that few, if any,
interest groups will line up in favor of reform.182 Single-issue groups have
disproportionate influence in the legislature.183 When it comes to crime,
single-issue groups almost all support get-tough-on-crime legislation.184 As a
result of the influence of money in politics, few politicians are likely to take
on powerful groups like the National Rifle Association and the California
Corrections and Peace Officers Association.185 Politicians have learned harsh
lessons when their opponents have tarnished them as soft on crime.186
Thus far, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY’s thesis finds support in the
failure of reform legislation to date. Legislators have placed several bills in
the hopper. For example, some would have limited Three Strikes by
requiring that the final felony be a serious or violent felony.187 More recently,
theft charges after stealing a $235 purse from Nordstrom’s. He had two prior strikes for convenience
store robberies. See id.
178. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(j) (West 1999).
179. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4.
180. Vitiello, Overblown Promises, supra note 23, at 280 (discussing ZIMRING ET AL., supra note
4).
181. See id.
182. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 222.
183. Id. at 173.
184. See Vitiello, Overblown Promises, supra note 23, at 280.
185. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 411 n.88.
186. See Pfingst et al., supra note 63, at 726–28, 739. The voters, in November 1986, linked the
California Supreme Court’s actions to a rising crime rate and ousted Justices Bird, Reynoso, and
Grodin. Id. at 730. In 1994, with eighty percent of the voters supporting the Three Strikes bill, id. at
739, Reynolds’ message to the Assembly was clear: pass the Three Strikes law or the voters will do it
for you. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 412–13.
187. SB 1517 specified that certain non-violent felonies would not result in sentence enhancement
under Three-Strikes for the current conviction. Third Reading of SB 1517, before Assembly Comm. on
Public Safety Analysis, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Apr. 1, 2002). AB 1790 would require that the
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Assembly Member Jackie Goldberg unsuccessfully sponsored a bill that
would have placed an initiative on the ballot to the same effect.188 To date,
the legislature has passed only two bills calling for further study of Three
Strikes; but Governors Wilson and Davis, both strong supporters of Three
Strikes, vetoed that legislation.189
As discussed above, California’s budget crisis may change the political
climate for reform.190 Empirical data support reform efforts: rational use of
prison resources can save money without jeopardizing public safety.191
Public opinion has shifted, and a significant majority of Californians now
favor reforming Three Strikes.192 Economic realities and the shift in public
sentiment make a discussion of sentencing reform worthwhile. This Article
examines the shape of possible reform in the next section.193

current conviction be for a serious or violent felony in order to qualify for Three-Strikes sentence
enhancement. Third Reading of AB 1790, before Assembly Comm. on Appropriations, 2001–2002 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. May 22, 2002). AB 112 is identical to AB 1790, requiring that the current convictions be
for, serious or violent felonies to enhance a sentence. Third Reading of AB 112, before Assembly
Comm. on Public Safety Analysis, 2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Jan. 13, 2003).
188. See id.
189. SB 2048 would examine the costs and benefits of the “Three Strikes” law and have findings
to the Legislature on or before July 1, 1999. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS
OF SB 2048, at 1 (July 7, 1998). Governor Pete Wilson vetoed this bill. GOVERNOR’S VETO OF SB
2048 (Sept. 13, 1998). SB 873 requires a study on the costs of the “Three Strikes” law. SENATE RULES
COMMITTEE, ANALYSIS OF SB 873, at 1–2 (Sept. 1, 1999). This bill was vetoed by Governor Gray
Davis as well. Id. at 9.
190. See supra notes 13, 110–12 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. In addition to outright release of aging
felons, the state should consider less expensive alternatives to incarceration in prison. Those
alternatives range from house arrest to intensively supervised parole.
192. Polling data suggest that over 60% of likely voters would vote to amend Three Strikes to
limit it to violent felons. Two organizations, Families to Amend California’s Three-Strikes and
Citizens Against Violent Crime, hired a well-established firm, Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin and
Associates, to conduct the survey. From January 4–7, 2002, the firm contacted 650 people likely to
vote in the next election; the survey had a margin of error of 3.8%. The survey asked a series of
questions, resulting in some important findings: about 74% “approve of the specific provision of the
[proposed] initiative that would require mandatory increased sentences only when convictions are for
violent felonies;” 73% disapprove of the current provisions that can give a third-time non-violent felon
a life sentence; about 65% favor amending the current law. See Citizens Against Violent Crimes, Voter
Survey, at http://www.amend3strikes.org/voters.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Voter
Survey]. See generally Families to Amend California’s Three-Strikes, Home Page, at
http://www.facts1.com (last modified Jan. 26, 2004); Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates, Home
Page, at http://www.urbanlogic.com/fmma/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
193. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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IV. INCREMENTAL, MODEST REFORM?
A. Wholesale Reform194
When I first wrote about Three Strikes, I argued that California should
reexamine its entire sentencing scheme. Specifically, I urged that the
legislature should establish a sentencing commission.195 A sentencing
commission could make recommendations for sentencing reform “out of the
glare of the media.”196 More generally, as Marc Klaas, Polly Klaas’s father
has argued, I contended that Three Strikes may provide too little punishment
for some offenders, and too much for others.197 My argument was that,
whether through recommendations of a sentencing commission or by action
of the legislature on its own, California should reexamine its entire
sentencing scheme.198 For example, given the reality that prison resources are
finite, I questioned whether California allocates resources wisely when it
sends a felon like Jesus Romero199 to prison for a minimum of 25 years, but
caps possible punishment for a robber to a term of nine years in prison.200
Since that time, what I have learned about sentencing commissions has
confirmed my belief that California would benefit from such an institution
charged with wholesale sentencing reform.201 Not all commissions are

194. In addition to the reforms that I propose, legislators and active proponents of reform, like
Families to Amend California’s Three Strikes (FACTS), have proposed legislation to limit Three
Strikes to cases in which the felon’s third felony is a violent or serious felony. See supra note 187. To
avoid the requirement of a super-majority, they have also proposed bills that would put a similar
limitation before the voters as a ballot initiative, originating in the legislature. See supra note 188.
Especially the latter approach makes sense and, given a shift in current public opinion about Three
Strikes, see Voter Survey, supra note 192, at 1 (discussing a public policy poll conducted by Fairbank,
Maslin, Maulin & Associates that revealed, among other things, that 65% of likely voters would vote
‘yes’ to amend perceived flaws in California’s Three-Strikes laws), such a measure has some chance
of success if it can get out of the legislature.
This Article focuses on two alternatives to such a measure. My discussion of legislation creating a
sentencing commission urges a more ambitious reform, while my discussion of legislation directing
the exercise of trial court’s discretion is a narrower approach that may provide a fallback position if
more sweeping reform is unsuccessful.
195. Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 461.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 454.
198. Id. at 455–62.
199. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
200. Id. at 454.
201. The American Law Institute (ALI) is currently involved in a major project to re-draft the
sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code. Although the sentencing sections of the Model Penal
Code were the least influential sections of the code, the ALI hopes that the new sentencing sections
will have the same dramatic effect that the Model Penal Code has had on criminal law. See MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING: REPORT (Apr. 11, 2003) [hereinafter MPC REPORT]; see also MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 1) (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter MPC Preliminary
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created equal; for example, the federal sentencing guidelines have earned few
supporters and many critics.202 But many participants in the criminal justice
system, across a broad political spectrum, are enthusiastic in their praise of a
number of state commissions.203 For example, a committee of the American
Law Institute is currently drafting new sentencing provisions of the Model
Penal Code; in its current form, the draft includes sections creating a
commission and enumerating its powers.204
That report catalogues advantages of a commission-guidelines system.205
A number of the specific advantages relate to the thesis of this Article.
Adoption of sentencing commissions has led to consistent, principled
individual sentencing decisions.206 While removing policymaking about
criminal punishment from “the glare of the political process,”207 a
commission, consisting of “representatives from all sectors of the criminaljustice system and from the general public”208 creates the opportunity for
Draft 1].
202. MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 48, 72.
203. Id. at 48–50, 72–74.
204. See MPC Preliminary Draft 1, supra note 201, at 42–53 (codifying the preliminary text for a
sentencing commission).
205. MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 49–50. Among many of the advantages of a sentencing
commission are:
The consistent application of law, policy, and principle to individual sentencing decisions. The
articulation of starting points for sentencing decisions, as opposed to the total absence of such
guidance in the cavernous penalty ranges of indeterminate-sentencing codes. New visibility of the
decision rules for sentencing, giving rise to new opportunities to study and debate those rules. A
vastly improved capacity for systemwide policy-making, including an ongoing process of
ensuring that penalties for discrete crime classifications make sense when matched against one
another. The enlargement of judicial discretion to make effective choices about punishments in the
cases before them, particularly in prison cases. Improved information about how the sentencing
system operates, and the creation of an ethic in legislative and other domains that high-quality
information should drive policy. The ability to make accurate predictions of future sentencing
patterns, in the aggregate and line-by-line by offense type, enabling the production of credible
fiscal-impact forecasts when changes in guidelines or laws affecting punishment are proposed . . . .
New tools to better understand and attack imbalances in criminal punishments as they affect
minority communities. The development of a common law of sentencing, through which
sentencing judges explain their decisions in selected cases, appellate courts may review those
decisions, and judges are the primary actors in the evolution of sentencing policy. The formation
of sentencing commissions composed of representatives from all sectors of the criminal-justice
system and from the general public, to work toward informed positions of sentencing policy that
carry credibility as reflecting the views of all relevant constituencies. The removal of at least some
policymaking about criminal punishment from the glare of the political process. A sensible
alternative to the proliferation of mandatory-penalty laws; one that can produce predictable
sentencing results overall, and can reflect public concern about violent crime, while preserving
judicial discretion in individual cases.
Id. (bullet points omitted).
206. Id. at 49.
207. Id. at 50.
208. Id.
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greater transparency. By contrast, in non-commission systems, many
decisions about sentencing are subject to little public scrutiny. Systemwide
policy-making ensures “that penalties for discrete crime classifications make
sense when matched against one another.”209 Once guidelines are in place,
litigants are able to challenge specific sentences, allowing appellate courts to
develop a common law of sentencing.210 Participants in the criminal justice
system have identified these (and other) advantages of the commission
system from empirical observations of state sentencing commission
systems.211
One of the most important benefits that states have derived from adoption
of a commission system is better “resource management.”212 Elsewhere, state
budget crises have forced state governments to address correctional
expenditures with an eye towards improving long-term planning.213 That is,
states with commissions in place are able to make reasoned decisions about
punishment in light of available correctional resources. In many instances,
guidelines have significantly increased penalties for violent crimes; the
commissions have had to accommodate the increased incarceration of violent
felons by reducing imprisonment for nonviolent offenders.214 Some states
have given commissions authority over sentencing policy generally, not just

209. Id. at 49.
210. See id. at 66.
211. See id. at 46–48.
212. Id. at 72.
213. Id. at 72–73. In discussing the advantages of sentencing commissions, the ALI states:
It is now possible to tell legislators and other policymakers, with reasonable precision, what the
price tag of a change in penalties will be, whether large or small, global or offense-specific. It is
further possible to build in mechanisms to ensure that there is willingness to fund needed
resources (or live within the constraints of existing resources) as a regular part of the lawmaking
process.
If desired, a sentencing commission can be instructed to do its work in light of available or
funded facilities . . . .
Id. at 79.
214. Id. at 80–81. As observed by the Report:
[M]ost state sentencing commissions have crafted guidelines to increase penalties for serious
violent offenses, sometimes very substantially. Usually, however, “toughness” on violence has
been paired with guidelines fashioned to reduce penalties for specific categories of nonviolent
offenses. Because the most serious crimes occur in far smaller numbers than less serious crimes,
many commissions have found that large incremental increases in punishments for violent
offenses may be offset with modest incremental decreases in sanctions for property crimes.
Id.
The point is worth underscoring because some Three Strikes proponents have dismissed
reformers’ arguments by contending that they oppose incarceration for convicted felons. See
Scheidegger & Rushford, supra note 54, at 59.
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prisons. That has allowed commissions to divert less serious offenders out of
prisons into other kinds of facilities or other community-based programs.215
The advantages for California should be obvious. During the 1980s and
1990s, the state’s prison population grew without regard to resources.216 As
indicated, a number of states, some of which are “tough-on-crime” states,
have used sentencing commissions to make rational allocation of prison
resources, stemming indiscriminate prison growth without sacrificing public
safety.217 Given California’s budget crisis, that is precisely what California
must do now.
California should adopt a sentencing commission system. The problem
with that solution is that if the legislature were to adopt enabling legislation
without a super-majority, Three Strikes sentences would be off the table. The
more plausible route would be for the legislature to place an initiative on the
ballot that would create a sentencing commission to create sentencing
guidelines, including guidelines for the appropriate use of Three Strikes.
Passage of sweeping legislation may be a long shot. But several
constituencies might support broad reform efforts, including those concerned
about excessive punishment and fiscal conservatives troubled by poor
allocation of resources.218
B. A More Modest Reform
Because sweeping reform may be difficult, I have proposed elsewhere
that California should adopt incremental reforms.219 When I started work on
this Article, my hypothesis was that a simple majority of the legislature could
adopt legislation implementing an initiative and that the super-majority
requirement applies only if the legislation modifies or amends the Three
Strikes law. I proposed to argue that, in light of the state supreme court’s
Romero decision, which gave trial courts discretion to strike prior felonies,220

215. MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 81–82.
216. See ZIMRING, supra note 4, at 155–59 (discussing the growth in the California prison system
population to the point where it is a larger prison system than that of the United Kingdom, France,
Canada, Germany, Italy, or Japan).
217. MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 80–84.
218. As I have observed elsewhere:
Over a decade ago, liberal activist Jonathan Turley was able to convince prison officials and
legislators in Louisiana to back a program designed to secure the release of older prisoners who
represented a low risk of recidivism. He did so by presenting economic, rather than humanitarian,
arguments to a conservative audience. Advocates of reform should follow his example in pursuing
changes in Three Strikes.
Vitiello, Overblown Promises, supra note 23, at 287.
219. Id. at 285–89.
220. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1996).
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the legislature could adopt a law guiding that discretion. For reasons
discussed below, I do not believe that my original thesis is correct. But in
reviewing Romero, I have developed a new thesis. Because Romero held that
Three Strikes did not intend to exempt Three Strikes from the requirements
of § 1385221 (a statute generally applicable to the exercise of trial court
discretion), a simple majority of the legislature is free to amend that
provision.
Hence, my proposal: below, I argue in favor of a system of guided
discretion under § 1385. Like a sentencing guideline system, the law would
direct trial courts to ascribe points to an offender’s criminal history. The
point total would determine the appropriate sentence from the available
sentencing options, absent some compelling reasons justifying a departure
from the guidelines. Such a system would address a concern raised by the
supreme court—that the legislature has not given guidance about how courts
should exercise their discretion under § 1385. The court has offered limited
guidance, leaving too much discretion with sentencing judges. Properly
construed, a law focusing on the exercise of sentencing discretion can result
in more sensible system-wide use of prison resources.
1. Implementing Three Strikes
Case law establishes that a simple majority of the legislature can adopt
legislation implementing an initiative.222 But that case law does not appear to
allow amendment to Three Strikes. Proposition 13, reforming California’s
property tax system, is a typical situation in which such legislation was
appropriate.223 As is often the case with constitutional provisions, Proposition
13 did not include the necessary level of detail to direct taxing authorities. A
simple majority of the legislature was able to adopt tax statutes to implement
the law.224 Outside that context, the legislature may not add to, subtract from,
or clarify Three Strikes absent a super-majority.225
Imposing a super-majority seems to violate principles of representative
democracy.226 But the California constitution and case law support such a

221. Id.
222. Because the voter initiative, Proposition 13 (codified as CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 4)
[hereinafter Prop. 13], involved the modification of a comprehensive set of taxation laws, the
legislature necessarily adopted or modified taxation statutes to reflect the intent of the voters. See, e.g.,
Munkdale v. Giannini, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
223. See supra note 222.
224. Id.
225. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory, 145 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
226. The obvious counter-argument to concerns that our institutions are not always based on
simple majority rule is to point to the important policy reasons that justify departure from those
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requirement. The constitution provides that the electors may “propose
statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.”227
The constitution allows the voters to retain entirely to themselves the power
to amend an initiative.228 The voters may exercise the lesser power of
allowing the legislature to amend the law subject to whatever conditions they
may impose; that is, they may lawfully impose a requirement of a supermajority.229 Some commentators have argued that the initiative process
violates the United States Constitution, which provides for a Republican
form of government.230 But as long as the initiative process is constitutional,
the requirement of a super-majority is most likely constitutional as well. That
is so because of United States Supreme Court case law upholding similar
requirements of a super-majority.231
Because Three Strikes is a comprehensive statute, California’s courts are
not likely to find latitude for the legislature to “implement” its provisions.
That means that the legislature must muster a two-thirds majority to amend
Three Strikes. Further, short of an unforeseen constitutional challenge, the
super-majority requirement is constitutional.
2. Modifying § 1385
Romero suggests an alternative route to a legislative reform free from the
requirement of a super-majority. This section reviews that route.
As discussed above, Romero resolved conflicting interpretations of
§ 667(f)(2) of the California Penal Code, which provides:232
principles. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 204–09. In PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY, the
authors discuss the Federal Reserve and central banks as the “most prominent example of the explicit
design of government institutions to insulate decision making from democrative control.” Id. at 204.
The central banks are designed to avoid inflationary pressures that would be exerted by popular will.
Id. at 204–05. One certainly can argue that criminal sentencing is one that does not justify requiring a
legislative super-majority.
227. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
228. Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. Quackenbush, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 347–48 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998).
229. Id. If the voters choose to give the legislature the power to amend an initiative, that power is
subject to whatever conditions the voters attach. Id.
230. The “Guarantee Clause” states: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Hans A. Linde, State Courts and Republican
Government, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 951 (2001).
231. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding against an equal protection challenge a West
Virginia law requiring a super-majority of the voters before a political subdivision could incur bond
indebtedness).
232. See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text for a discussion of Romero.
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The prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony
conviction allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to Section
1385, or if there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction.
If upon the satisfaction of the court that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the prior felony conviction, the court may dismiss or strike
the allegation.233
Uncertain was whether a court could strike a prior felony on its own motion
(and thereby, remove a case from the Three Strikes provisions or to make a
third strike felon subject only to second strike provisions) only if the
evidence that the defendant committed the prior felony were insufficient or
whether the court could also strike a prior felony in furtherance of justice,
consistent with § 1385.234
The statute seems to limit the court’s ability to strike a felony “in
furtherance of justice” on its own motion because it specifies that only the
prosecutor may do so.235 In addition, a reading that would deprive the court
of that power is consistent with the legislative history. For example, Mike
Reynolds, whose dogged efforts led to the passage of the law, believed
“liberal” judges could not be trusted to enforce the law’s extreme
penalties.236
The supreme court concluded to the contrary—that the legislation did not
intend to limit judges’ authority under § 1385.237 The court’s analysis is
detailed and thorough.238 But for purposes of this Article, the court’s specific
holding is most important. Section 1385 gives the court, on its own motion,
the authority to dismiss an action against a defendant “in the furtherance of

233. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(2).
234. Compare Romero, 917 P.2d at 640–49 (granting a trial court the discretion to strike prior
felonies on its own motion), with People v. Bailey, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 210 (1995) (reversing a trial
court’s decision to strike a prior felony on its own motion in the furtherance of justice).
235. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385.
236. See Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1656–61, 1690–91.
237. See Romero, 917 P.2d at 632–46 (holding that to deny a trial court the authority to strike a
felony on its motion would violate the California Constitution and that California’s Three-Strikes
legislation did not express a clear intent of the legislature to eliminate a court’s power to strike a prior
felony or to dismiss in the interests of justice under section 1385); see also Vitiello, “Three Strikes”
and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1693–94 (discussing the Romero decision clarifying the trial
courts’ power to strike prior felonies under Penal Code sections 667 and 1385).
238. Romero, 917 P.2d at 632–46. Elsewhere, I have argued that the court rejected the most
plausible reading of the text and the statute’s legislative history but that the court’s position that the
contrary reading of the statute would have raised serious separation-of-powers concerns was sound.
Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1693–1700. Despite that
disagreement with the way that the court reached its result, the opinion is, in fact, detailed and
thorough in its discussion, working through numerous arguments and offering close readings of the
text.
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justice.”239 That provision applies to criminal cases generally. While the
legislature may abrogate that authority entirely, the court will not infer an
intent to do so absent a clear legislative directive.240
Despite the arguments that the language and history of Three Strikes
demonstrate an intent to abrogate § 1385 in Three Strikes cases, the court
read the statute to the contrary in order to avoid a violation of California’s
constitutional separation of powers doctrine.241 The case law interpreting the
California constitution found that, while the legislature could deprive courts
of the power of dismissal entirely, the legislature could not create the power
to dismiss and then condition its exercise on approval of the district
attorney.242 Dismissal in furtherance of justice is a judicial function that the
California constitution prevents from being shared with the executive.243 As a
result, had the court concluded that § 667(f)(2) deprived the court of the
ability to strike a prior felony on its own motion, that provision would have
violated the state constitution.244
The court then read the statute as leaving intact a judge’s power to
dismiss under § 1385. That was the case, in part, because § 1385 is a general
grant of power in criminal cases, and the court will not imply an intent to
abrogate that power absent a clear intent to do so.245 Hence, § 667(f)(2)’s
reference to § 1385 was sufficiently ambiguous to survive the court’s close
textual reading.246
Thus, Three Strikes incorporates judicial discretion to strike prior felonies
consistent with § 1385. Because Romero held that Three Strikes left § 1385
intact, the legislature should be able to modify § 1385 without achieving a

239. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a).
240. Romero, 917 P.2d at 640.
241. Id. at 636–37.
242. People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1970). The court stated, “[t]he judicial power is
compromised when a judge . . . wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do
so he must bargain with the prosecutor.” Id. at 996. The Court was also disturbed by the fact that “the
discretion section 11718 purports to vest in prosecutors is unreviewable, and may therefore be
exercised in a totally arbitrary fashion.” Id.
243. See id. at 995–97; see also CAL. CONST. art III, § 3.
244. Romero, 917 P. 2d at 636–38.
245. Id. at 639–40.
246. Id. In Romero, the defendant argued that under § 1385(b), which does not allow a judge to
strike a prior felony for the purpose of sentence enhancement, Three Strikes was a sentencing scheme
and not an enhancement. Therefore, the judiciary’s power of discretion would remain intact. But then,
the court noted that under § 667, the legislature did grant someone the power to strike a prior felony,
and the power to strike under § 1385(a) can only rest in the judiciary. The supreme court concluded
that it would make no sense to grant power under § 667 and preclude its exercise under § 1385(b).
Thus, sections 667 and 1385 lacked sufficient clarity to abrogate the judiciary’s power of discretion.
See the supreme court’s discussion concerning the lack of statutory clarity in Romero, 917 P.2d at
644–47.
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super-majority because that law was adopted without any special
requirements of a super-majority for its amendment.247 Further, Romero even
invited the legislature to define “in furtherance of justice” when it
commented that the legislature’s failure to do so left appellate courts “with
the task of establishing the boundaries of the judicial power conferred by the
statute.”248 As developed below, legislation might be crafted to narrow the
exercise of trial courts’ discretion to assure that they impose Three Strikes
sentences only in those cases that are most appropriate.
V. NARROWING DISCRETION
Above, this Article focused on why reforming Three Strikes is important:
it causes a misallocation of resources, often in cases where the punishment is
disproportionate to the crime.249 A distinct problem has arisen as well:
prosecutors and judges apply the law so inconsistently that it has led to
“uneven justice” across the state.250
While prosecutors typically have wide discretion in charging decisions,
Three Strikes’ drafters intended that prosecutors charge every defendant who
qualified as a third-strike offender and then to allow the prosecutor to move
to strike a prior felony.251 Thereafter, the prosecutor could move to strike a
prior felony only because dismissal would be in furtherance of justice or
because evidence supporting the conviction was insufficient; or the court
could do so if the evidence was insufficient.252 But that is not how
prosecutors and courts have applied the law.253 Full implementation of the
law would worsen the law’s excesses. But current implementation produces
undesirable results: gross variations from county to county are

247. The California Supreme Court found that the judiciary’s discretion, under § 1385, is limited
by the amorphous concept “in furtherance of justice.” Romero, 917 P.2d at 648. But because Three
Strikes was the implementation of a voter initiative, the legislature could modify or amend § 1385, by
a simple majority, to give effect to the true intent of the voters. For a discussion of modifying or
amending an initiative, see supra note 222 and accompanying text.
248. Romero, 917 P.2d at 648 (quoting People v. Orin, 533 P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1975)).
249. See, e.g., supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text (discussing Jesus Romero and Leandro
Andrade, both Three Strikes’ prisoners whose records indicate that they are not particularly
dangerous).
250. See Marion, supra note 34, at 29 (describing that “uneven justice” resulted from “significant
geographic disparities in its use, widespread incarceration of non-violent offenders, and increased
impact on racial minorities”).
251. See id. at 31, 37.
252. See id. at 31–32.
253. See id. at 36–38. The author, conducting a study of San Diego County Three Strikes case
files, illustrates the inconsistency in applying Three Strikes through several cases. See id. at 37–38. For
example, in drug cases, the prosecution “permitted a reduced sentence in 22 percent of the drug cases
while the court reduced sentences in 51 percent of the drug cases.” Id. at 37.
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inappropriate.254 Further, in some counties, prosecutors continue to use the
law to prosecute defendants like Leandro Andrade, resulting in
disproportionate punishment that contributes little to social protection and
misallocates resources.255 Further, while fewer third-strike felons are being
sentenced to prison over time, their total numbers are still significant.256
Prosecutorial discretion in charging offenders may be so ingrained in our
system that calling for its reform is naive.257 Similar problems do not arise
with efforts to limit the inequity that results from the exercise of judicial
discretion. For example, thirty years ago, Judge Marvin E. Frankel brought
attention to gross disparity in criminal sentences. In his book CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER, he argued that “the almost wholly
unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of
sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion
to the rule of law.”258 He cited several problems in the then-prevailing system
of indeterminate sentencing: judges not only had broad latitude in
pronouncing a sentence but were given no guidance in how to exercise that
discretion.259 Even fundamental questions like those relating to the
justification or purpose of punishment were left to individual judges.260
Further, the law required no explanation for why a judge chose a particular
sentence.261
Frankel went beyond an indictment of the current sentencing system. He
championed use of a federal sentencing commission.262 Part of the
commission’s responsibility was to be the development of presumptive
sentences based on numerous objective factors relating to the gravity of the
offense.263 His goal was to achieve less disparity among sentences and
greater justice to those imprisoned.264

254. See Bowers, supra note 35, at 1182 (demonstrating the unacceptable application of Three
Strikes by asking the reader to “[i]magine for a moment that the legislature announced that any felony
could constitute a third strike in San Diego, but that only a violent or serious crime would trigger the
law in San Francisco or Alameda”).
255. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
256. As of December 31, 2002, the number of third-strike offenders behind bars in California was
7,626. INSTITUTION POPULATION, supra note 71, at tbl.1. See also discussion supra note 172.
257. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (3d ed. 2000) (describing
the prosecutor’s discretion as “firmly entrenched in American law”).
258. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973) [hereinafter
FRANKEL].
259. See id. at 7.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 42–43.
262. See id. at 118–24.
263. See id. at 114.
264. See FRANKEL, supra note 258, at 111–15.
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Frankel was hardly alone in his critique of excessive judicial discretion in
determining criminal sentences. CRIMINAL SENTENCES was part of the
movement in favor of determinate sentencing and sentencing
commissions.265 Both of those developments were premised on his view that
unbridled sentencing discretion is inappropriate.266
The implementation of Three Strikes raises some of the concerns that
Judge Frankel identified. Depending on the courtroom, a defendant may face
no or little jail time or 25 years-to-life for the same conduct.267 Apart from
the discretion that prosecutors may exercise outside the courtroom, even the
prevailing standard governing judicial discretion, acting in “furtherance of
justice,” is at best “amorphous,” as the state supreme court has recognized.268
In absence of legislative action, the state supreme court has attempted to
narrow the exercise of judicial discretion under § 1385. People v. Williams
addressed the problem in the context of a Three Strikes sentence.269 Williams
held that a court had to exercise its discretion to advance the goals of the
particular sentencing scheme.270 That required a balance of both individual
constitutional rights (specifically, relating to proportional sentencing) and
“society’s legitimate interests.”271 Factors like court congestion or antipathy
to the severe consequences for the defendant, without more, are extrinsic to
the sentencing scheme, and, therefore, irrelevant to the proper exercise of the
court’s discretion.272 But the court should consider factors “intrinsic to the
scheme, such as the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects.”273

265. See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1019–26 (1991)
(discussing several works that critiqued indeterminate sentencing); see also id. at 1027–32 (discussing
the federal sentencing guidelines and other sentencing reforms).
266. See FRANKEL, supra note 258, at 5. Many commentators argue that at least some of Frankel’s
proposals have been carried too far. The federal sentencing commission and guidelines are considered
a failure. See MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 48, 115–25. Mandatory minimum sentences, the
antipode of unbridled sentencing discretion, have led to injustice. Id. at 109–12.
267. Consider the crime of “petty theft,” which is ordinarily a misdemeanor punishable by fine, a
term of imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 1999).
However, when a defendant has committed certain prior offenses, “petty theft” may be treated as a
felony under California’s Three-Strikes law. People v. Terry, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 771 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). In Andrade, the defendant was convicted of two counts of petty theft and sentenced to 25-yearsto-life. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003); see also discussion supra notes 66–71 and
accompanying text.
268. People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 648 (Cal. 1996).
269. People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1998).
270. Id. at 436–37.
271. Id. at 437.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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Williams and Romero offer a roadmap for a modest legislative reform of
Three Strikes. Modeled on sentencing-guideline legislation, California might
adopt a sentencing scheme that would create objective criteria to determine
whether a court should impose a sentence under Three Strikes or, instead,
strike a prior felony in furtherance of justice.
Like Williams’ command, successful sentencing guideline systems have
attempted to achieve maximum social protection consistent with proportional
punishment.274 In typical guideline states, a sentencing commission develops
standards to guide judges’ sentencing decisions.275 Enabling legislation
directs the commission to follow guiding principles.276 For example, the
legislature may direct the commission to assess cost of incarceration in light
of social protection.277 It may require the commission to assess the
appropriate punishment consistent with specific goals of punishment, like the
need for retribution and deterrence, but limited by the principle of
proportionality.278
The commission’s major initial responsibility is to translate general goals
into guidelines to govern case-specific sentences.279 Thus, with general goals

274. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0014(1)(a) (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 777.50(1), 777.56, 777.57 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003); Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, Guideline II,
Subdivision B, MINN. STAT. ANN. app. § 244 (West 2003); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-004-0006(1) (2002);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.525 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); see also MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 2 June 3, 2003) [hereinafter MPC Preliminary Draft 2]. Even
though each sentencing guideline system is unique, each uses the offender’s criminal history, severity
of the current offense, culpability for the current offense, etc., to determine the appropriate sentence.
By using the characteristics of each individual offender, a sentencing-guideline system can impose a
much more appropriate sentence than a one-size-fits-all sentencing system.
275. See, e.g., Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, Guideline II, Subdivision B. The Minnesota system
has a criminal history index which includes: “(1) prior felony record; (2) custody status at the time of
the offense; (3) prior misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor record; and (4) prior juvenile record for
young adult felons.” Id. A criminal history score is calculated by totaling the points from each
category. Weights are then assigned to the scores for each category, as required by the sentencing
guideline. Id. at Subdivision B(1). The final total will determine the presumptive sentence for the
current conviction. The statute does allow for judicial discretion in adjusting the presumptive sentence
if the case involves “substantial and compelling circumstances.” Id. at Subdivision D.
276. See MPC Preliminary Draft 2, supra note 274, at 5, 9. The ALI’s model sentencing code is
being developed by studying the sentencing guideline statutes from the state codes discussed supra
note 275. The ALI states, regarding the establishment and purpose of the sentencing commission, that
the commission shall “ . . . perform its work and provide explanations for its actions consistent with
the purposes of the sentencing and corrections system . . . .” Id. at 9 (New Section 6A.01(e)).
277. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-802(d)(4)(C) (requiring the commission to “monitor
compliance with sentencing standards [and] assess their impact on the correctional resources of the
state”).
278. The Arkansas sentencing commission is charged with “review[ing] the classifications of
crimes and sentences and mak[ing] recommendations for change when supported by information that
change is advisable to further the adopted sentencing policy goals of the state.” Id. § (d)(5).
279. The Maryland General Assembly codified its intent in establishing a guideline sentencing
commission. Among other things, the Assembly intended the commission to create guidelines that are
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established, the commission identifies characteristics relevant to the
appropriate punishment.280 In many jurisdictions, the commission creates
numerical guidelines by assigning numerical scores to certain offender and
offense characteristics and places those factors on a grid.281
The commission may create a grid, for example, with a vertical axis
representing the offense score, which gives a score for specific aspects of the
offender’s criminal conduct (increasing the score, for example, if the crime
was one of violence),282 and a horizontal axis measuring the offender’s score,
which focuses on the offender’s record.283 After the commission has created
the grid, a sentencing court must assess the particular offender’s
characteristics and find a presumptive sentence on the grid.284
Other jurisdictions use a step-by-step formula to assess the sentence. The
court must assess the seriousness of the crime, make adjustments for the
offender’s criminal history, and determine a final score.285 The court then
translates the score into a presumptive criminal sentence.286 Some
jurisdictions require an assessment of additional factors, including whether
the current offense is similar to prior crimes287 and how much time has
elapsed since the prior crimes.288
“fair and proportional.” MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PRO. § 6-202 (2001).
280. See, e.g., id. § 6-208.
281. E.g., Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, Guideline II, subdivision B (defining the point values for
each offense). Once the points are assigned, they are totaled and the presumptive sentence is found on
a grid. Id. at Guideline IV.
282. Id. at Guideline IV. The vertical axis in the Minnesota presumptive sentencing grid
represents the severity level for the present offense. When an offender is convicted of multiple
offenses, the most severe convicted offense determines the present offense severity level. Id. at
Guideline II, Subdivision A. Felony offenses are divided into eleven levels, from low (Severity Level
I), to high (Severity Level XI). Id. As an example of the Minnesota severity levels, theft of property
valued at $2500 or less is a level II crime whereas second-degree murder is a level XI crime. Id. at
Guideline IV. First-degree murder is exempted from the list and carries a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment. Id. at Guideline II, Subdivision A.
283. Id. at Guideline II, Subdivision B. Minnesota divides criminal history into four categories.
See discussion supra note 275. The offender is assigned points of particular weights for every prior
felony conviction as well as extended jurisdiction juvenile convictions. Id. at Subdivision B(1). The
weights assigned to prior convictions are determined by the severity level of each prior offense. Id.
284. See id. at Guideline II, Subdivision C; see also MPC Preliminary Draft 2, supra note 274, at
35 (New Section 7.XX).
285. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0014(1)–(2) (West 2001). In Florida, a weighted score is
given to the current offense, denominated as the primary offense. The number of points for the primary
offense range from four points, for a level one offense, to 116, for a level ten offense. Unlike
Minnesota, multiple convictions are counted into the point total, but they carry less weight. Certain
factors will then influence the score, such as injury to a victim, a crime that is sexual in nature, and
drug trafficking. Points for prior offenses are added to the points for the primary offense to determine
the recommended sentence.
286. Id. § 921.0014.
287. See, e.g., 204 PA. CODE § 303.4(a) (2003). Depending on the justification for punishment, the
similarity of the prior offense to the current offense may be highly relevant. Retributivists, for
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One of the obvious goals of a guideline system is reducing disparity
among sentences.289 Nonetheless, case-specific factors may weigh against
imposition of a particular sentence. Depending on the jurisdiction, the
guideline sentence is a presumptive sentence, leaving the judge some
discretion in departing from that sentence.290 Guideline systems reflect a
preference that judges exercise that discretion rather than other actors in the
criminal justice system.291 Judges are more accountable than other actors;
their decisions are public and the relevant legislation may require them to
provide a written explanation for any departure from the guidelines.292
example, have difficulty justifying additional punishment based on an offender’s past conduct.
Punishment cannot be for the prior offenses because, for a retributivist, the offender has paid his debt
to society. Some retributivist scholars have argued that where an offender is now punished for conduct
similar to his past criminal acts, society is justified in punishing the offender. The earlier punishment
reflected a willingness of society to show lenience to allow the offender to learn from his punishment.
The current punishment is only that which the offender deserves, without any continuing forbearance.
For a more detailed discussion of the philosophical debate surrounding recidivist statutes, see Vitiello,
Judicial Activism supra note 128 (manuscript at 49–60). Those systems that add points based on the
similarity of the current offense to past criminal conduct are influenced by that kind of reasoning.
288. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0014(1)(b); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 777.50(2); Minn.
Sentencing Guidelines, Guideline II, Subdivision B(1)–(2). Minnesota’s criminal history index
includes the custody status of the offender at time of the current conviction. If a defendant is on
probation, parole, supervised release, conditional release, or confined in a jail, workhouse, or prison
during the commission of the current offense, extra points are added to the criminal history index
score. Id. Subdivision B(2).
289. See FRANKEL, supra note 258, at 61, 111–15.
290. Many commentators have criticized the federal sentencing commission. The federal
guidelines employ the concept of “real offenses” and “alleged offenses” that allow sentence
enhancements based on “uncharged relevant conduct.” See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing
Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173, 176 (1995). Advocates of the “real offense” and
“alleged offense” approach argue that it allows judges to counteract prosecutorial discretion during
charging and plea negotiations. See DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE
EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA’S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 55 (Daniel J. Freed ed., 1988). However,
critics argue that the price exacted on constitutional values is too high. Id. Under “real offense”
sentencing, an offender may be sentenced based on crimes for which he has not been convicted,
having the effect of lowering the standard of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to a preponderance
of the evidence, the standard used for considerations of fact in sentencing. Id. at 54–55. For a detailed
list of criticisms of the federal sentencing guidelines, see MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 115–25
(discussing the overwhelming complexity and rigidity of the federal sentencing guidelines).
291. The goal of sentencing guidelines was to create a system of uniform and proportional
criminal sentencing. However, it would be hard to disagree that a specific sentence will not be
appropriate in every situation. Judicial sentencing discretion has been considered preferable in
sentencing guidelines because the judiciary is “the most accountable.” Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of
Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679, 689 (1993).
292. Id. Systems vary on their approaches to departure from the guidelines, with some
jurisdictions disfavoring departure. See, e.g., KANS. STAT. ANN. § 21-4716(a) (2002) (requiring a
“substantial and compelling” reason to deviate from the presumptive sentence). Some guidelines
include specific factors that may militate in favor of an upward or downward departure. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.0016(3)–(4). Other schemes list factors, such as race and sex, that the court may not
consider in deciding whether to depart from the presumptive sentence. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 769.34(3) (West 2000).
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Williams293 suggests the limits of a court’s ability to frame a coherent
guideline system. There, the supreme court identified some general
considerations to govern the exercise of trial courts’ sentencing discretion
under the “in furtherance of justice” standard.294 But the generality of those
factors and the deference that appellate courts must show the trial court’s
exercise of discretion295 have not remedied the gross disparity in Three
Strikes cases that critics have identified.296
Any legislation along the guidelines model would have to conform to the
general guidelines spelled out in Romero297 and Williams;298 if not,
presumably, the court would view the law as an attempt to amend Three
Strikes.299 But the legislature could draft legislation similar to guideline
statutes described above that would be consistent with supreme court case
law interpreting the “spirit” of Three Strikes.300
For example, Williams held that a court had to exercise its discretion to
advance the goals of the particular sentencing scheme.301 In context, that
required an examination of principles of proportionality and the protection of
societal interests.302 Justice Mosk indicated that society has an interest in the
prosecution of criminal offenses.303 A second goal might be the overall
efficient management of its prison resources. Those general factors are
virtually identical to the general goals articulated in statutes creating
sentencing commissions.304
Three Strikes’ proponents might argue that Three Strikes’ drafters
intended for the sentencing scheme to be mandatory for anyone coming
within the provisions of the law.305 Certainly, even some of the law’s critics
have acknowledged that the courts and prosecutors do not appear to have
given effect to the intended mandatory effect of the law.306 Williams and

293. People v. Williams, 948 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1998).
294. Williams, 948 P.2d at 435–36.
295. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 648 (Cal. 1996).
296. See Marion, supra note 34, at 29; Bowers, supra note 35, at 1182.
297. 917 P.2d at 648.
298. 948 P.2d at 435–36.
299. Courts regularly define a statute as an amendment even if it only seeks to clarify an existing
law. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Cory, 145 Cal. Rptr. 819, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (citing Balian Ice
Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 94 F. Supp. 796, 798–99 (S.D. Cal. 1950)); Mobilepark W.
Homeowners Ass’n v. Escondido Mobilepark W., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 398–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
300. Williams, 948 P.2d at 436.
301. Id. at 436–37.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., supra note 279.
305. See, e.g., Ardaiz, supra note 48, at 212; Jones, supra note 26, at 23–25.
306. See, e.g., Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case, supra note 27, at 1690–1700;
Bowers, supra note 35, at 1175–80.
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Romero rebut those arguments: Romero found the law’s intent sufficiently
ambiguous to reject that argument;307 Williams makes clear that the Three
Strikes sentencing scheme is not mechanical.308 The court is explicit that
discretion should be exercised in light of principles of proportionality and
other factors.309 Implicit in the Williams court’s discussion is a recognition
that the law targeted the most serious repeat offenders, the murderers, rapists
and child molesters identified in campaign literature, and that courts may use
their discretion to avoid its improper use in cases not involving any similar
risk of social harm.310
Williams does not allow courts to consider some factors like court
congestion or antipathy to the severe consequences for the defendant,
extrinsic to the sentencing scheme.311 But the court should properly consider
factors “intrinsic to the scheme, such as the nature and circumstances of the
defendant’s present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects.”312 Those are the kinds of directives that state legislatures have
given sentencing commissions.313
Using legislation, instead of evolving judicial standards, offers a number
of advantages. Sentencing guidelines create greater uniformity—one of the
problems existing under the current administration of Three Strikes in
California.314 More importantly, legislative standards can weed out the kinds
of cases that misallocate resources.315 If California adopted a model using
points ascribed to an offender’s criminal past and current offense, offenders
who have no crimes of violence in their past and whose current offense is not
a violent offense should have low point totals.316 The guidelines would then
require a trial court to strike a prior felony “in furtherance of justice,” absent

307. See People v. Superior Court (Romero), 917 P.2d 628, 641–42 (Cal. 1996).
308. Williams, 948 P.2d at 435–36.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 437.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. For a discussion of sentencing guidelines and the factors that various systems use to
determine a presumptive sentence, see supra notes 282–88.
314. See Marion, supra note 34, at 29, 36–38.
315. See, e.g., supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. In the 1980s and 1990s many states
established sentencing guidelines to manage resources and control growing prison populations. See
Leonard Orland & Kevin R. Reitz, Epilogue: A Gathering of State Sentencing Commissions, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 837, 839–40 (1993); see also MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 72–79.
316. See, e.g., Minn. Sent. Guidelines II & IV (providing presumptive sentences of between
eighteen and twenty-two months for nonviolent criminals even when the current sentence is calculated
using the maximum criminal history score).
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some reasoned basis to deviate from the presumptive standard.317 If a court
deviated from the guidelines, by either failing to strike a prior felony or
striking a prior felony in a case where the guidelines created a presumption
against a strike, as the law now requires,318 the court would have to justify
the decision in a written order.319
Such a sentencing scheme would be an improvement over the existing
hit-or-miss application of Three Strikes. Further, it would begin reducing the
number of felons entering the prison system whose long sentences are
unwarranted. The effect of such a statute would be to create greater equality
among third-strike defendants and proportionality for individual third-strike
defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
For many years, the nation looked to California as a trendsetter. For much
of the 1980’s and 1990’s, it became a trendsetter in the movement to
incarcerate large numbers of felons.320 It now runs the second largest prison
system in the free world.321 But as empirical evidence now demonstrates,
California’s massive prison system and draconian sentencing laws guarantee
poor use of resources: limited social protection cannot justify the cost of
warehousing many felons serving long prison sentences.322
The challenge for California is how to reform itself. Three Strikes saddled
California with a requirement of a super-majority for legislative reform. Both
the prison union and victims’ groups have extraordinary sway with the
legislature. But California’s worsening financial conditions may have a silver
lining for those interested in responsible sentencing policy.
One trend that California has not followed is the recourse to sentencing
commissions. In many states, commissions have proven to be effective in

317. Williams, 948 P.2d at 435–37.
318. Id.
319. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0016(1)(c) (requiring a written statement delineating the
reasons for a departure from a presumptive sentence); Minn. Sent. Guidelines II, Subdivision D. The
requirement of a written order explaining the exercise of discretion allows the appellate courts to
develop a common law of sentencing, further guiding the exercise of judges’ discretion when they
depart from the guidelines. MPC REPORT, supra note 201, at 66.
320. See Vitiello, Return to Rationality?, supra note 22, at 409–10.
321. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 4, at 17, 18 fig.2.1. Based on 1990 figures, California had a
prison population of 97,309. This figure was more than the prison population of England and Germany
combined. Id. at 18 fig.2.1. Today, California’s inmate population has grown to 160,315 but is no
longer the largest in the free world. The federal government’s inmate population recently surpassed
that of California. Number Imprisoned Exceeds 2 Million, Justice Dept. Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 7,
2003, at A4.
322. See supra notes 66–117 and accompanying text.
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improving the allocation of prison resources and other available sentencing
options. They have achieved efficiency without serious risk to public safety.
This Article has urged legislative reforms. Alternatively, it has argued in
favor of broad reform that would adopt the commission model. As Marc
Klaas has argued, California may provide too little punishment for some
violent felons, while it provides too much time for non-violent felons. A
commission could reexamine California’s skewed priorities.
It has also argued for less sweeping reform. Using the sentencing
guidelines model, California could adopt a statute that would guide judges in
their exercise of discretion when they decide whether to impose 25-years-tolife sentences under Three Strikes. Such a scheme could avoid unnecessary
incarceration of aging felons who no longer pose a serious social risk and
create greater statewide uniformity in the application of the law.
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